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 Afrikaanse Opsomming 
Die internasionale intelligensie gemeenskap steier steeds na verskeie intelligensie terugslae 
die afgelope dekade. Voorstelle om intelligensie analise te verbeter het weinig impak terwyl 
analiste, hulle bestuurders en organisasies voortgaan om vas te hou aan uitgediende 
bedreigingsperspesies, analitiese metodes en organisatoriese strukture en kulture. Deur die 
lens van Kennis Bestuur, poog hierdie verhandeling om die verskeie uitdagings wat die 
Intelligensie Analise praktyk in die Kennis Era in die gesig staar, te identifiseer. Eerstens 
word bestaande teorieë en konsepte in Intelligensie Analise met dié in Kennis Bestuur 
vergelyk en die moontlikheid van ‘n nuwe woordeskat vir intelligensie word bespreek.  Die 
tweede uitdaging vir intelligensie analiste is om by die nuwe wêreld en versnellende 
verandering aan te pas. Hulle word nou gekonfronteer met ‘n bedreigingsprent wat 
veelvlakkig, kompleks en multi-dissiplinêr is. Die derde uitdaging is om die bestaande 
analitiese metodologiëe, hulpmiddels en tegnieke te herwaardeer in die lig van hierdie nuwe 
wêreld. Die vierde uitdaging is om na ander dissiplines, insluitend dié van Kennis Bestuur, uit 
te reik sodat Intelligensie Analise verbeter kan word deur die toepassing van hierdie 
dissiplines se analitiese metodes (beide intuitief en gestruktureerd), hul kognitiewe en 
samewerkings modelle, sowel as organisasie struktuur konsepte. Laastens word 
geargumenteer dat Intelligensie Analiste dalk gereed is om hulself te vernuwe, maar dat hul 
intelligensie organisasies nie ‘n nuwe intelligensie paradigma kan ondersteun terwyl hulle 
voortgaan om bedreigingspersepsies, strukture en bestuurbeginsels toe te pas wat eerder by 
die Koue Oorlog tuis hoort nie. 
 
 English Summary 
The intelligence community throughout the world is still reeling after several intelligence 
failures. Proposals to improve Intelligence Analysis have had little impact as analysts, their 
managers and their organisations continue to cling to outdated threat perceptions, 
methodologies and organisational structures and cultures. This thesis looks through the lens of 
Knowledge Management at the various challenges that the Intelligence Analysis practice is 
faced with in the Knowledge Age. Firstly, theories and concepts from Intelligence Analysis 
are challenged when compared with those in Knowledge Management and the possibility of 
applying new vocabularies in intelligence is discussed. The second challenge intelligence 
analysts face is to understand and adapt to the changed world with its connected, non-linear 
and rapidly enfolding events and patterns which broadens their scope to a multi-faceted, 
complex and multi-disciplinary threat picture. The third challenge is to re-look the existing 
analytical methodologies, tools and techniques, realising that these are most probably 
inadequate in a complex environment. The fourth challenge Intelligence Analysis faces is to 
reach out to other disciplines and assess how new analytical techniques, both intuitive and 
structured, as well as cognitive models, collaborative and organisational structure concepts 
from within the Knowledge Management discipline can improve Intelligence Analysis’ grasp 
of the Knowledge Age. In conclusion, it is argued that intelligence analysts might be ready to 
reinvent themselves to address Knowledge Age issues, but that intelligence organisations are 
not able to support a new intelligence paradigm while still clinging to threat perceptions and 
structures befitting the Cold War.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
“In this rapidly changing and volatile world, the expectations required of those in the 
intelligence discipline are high - knowledge of the hidden and foreknowledge of the 
unpredictable.” 
Edward Waltz 1  
 
We are living in an age where the landscape is characterised by accelerating change, rising 
uncertainty and increasing complexity.2  Our survival, to a large extent, depends on our ability 
to understand, interpret and act using our skills, experience and knowledge. The global 
intelligence community, those structures and organisations responsible for providing 
foreknowledge to decision-makers, has been catapulted into a new era where Thomas 
Friedman’s metaphor of the flat earth3 has become a stark and threatening reality.    
The conflict space is now global and extends across the physical, symbolic, and cognitive 
realms.4 Governments, their security apparatus and other non-state actors function within an 
era where the compression of time and space and the easy movement of people, weapons, 
toxins, drugs, knowledge and ideas have become the norm. Intelligence organisations, 
whether in or outside the government, find it difficult to understand and provide warning on 
complex, asymmetric, real and emerging threats and risks.  
Few countries, companies, groups and even individuals in today’s globalised world have 
escaped the intangible consequences of a post-9/11 world, namely, a new, trans-national and 
globalised security risk, heightened public awareness of the role of intelligence and the rapid 
spread of ideas, ideologies and alliances on local, national and international security and other 
issues. Bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation have increased significantly on 
topics such as counterterrorism, economic and food security, organised crime, corruption, 
                                                 
1   Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the intelligence enterprise, xiii 
2   Bennet, Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex 
Adaptive System, 17  
3   Friedman, Thomas L. 2006. The world is flat: the globalized world in the twenty-first century  
4   Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 8 
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health risks, military and peace-keeping issues, technological advances and other shared 
concerns.  
Never before has intelligence, and specifically Intelligence Analysis, been so exposed to 
public scrutiny and discourse. This has been the case especially in the US, where the 9/11 
“post mortems” mainly focused on organisational and systemic reform, but more importantly, 
raised questions about the traditional, secret “need to know” intelligence paradigm. The new 
environment made it imperative for all stakeholders in intelligence, on all levels, to share 
intelligence and study improved ways to develop insight in the new era and anticipate 
surprises.5 
Moreover, intelligence is not the lone prerogative of governments and their secret 
organisations anymore. It has become a critical success factor for all the actors on the world 
stage like multi-national corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and smaller 
interest groups that have become more powerful than the traditional nation-states. From being 
regarded with scepticism and surrounded by myths found in books and movies, intelligence is 
now practised in business, the public and private sectors - wherever the two factors of power 
and competition exist.6 The veil of secrecy around intelligence tradecraft, especially 
Intelligence Analysis is gradually lifting.  
1.1 Focus of the thesis  
With the increased focus on intelligence, and Intelligence Analysis in particular, this thesis 
considers how Intelligence Analysis as a discipline meets the challenges posed by the new 
knowledge landscape. Firestone and McElroy’s comment that “there is no more important, 
more urgent need for the new Knowledge Management than in the intelligence business,”7 
illustrates the seriousness with which those outside the conventional intelligence community 
regard the situation. With the emphasis on knowledge organisations in the Knowledge Age, 
and the growing importance of intelligence, the question is posed about those challenges 
Intelligence Analysis, as the nexus of knowledge creation in the intelligence organisation, 
faces and how they are met, if at all? 
A literature study of Knowledge Management, intelligence and Intelligence Analysis was 
undertaken to determine what the impact of the Knowledge Age landscape is on Intelligence 
                                                 
5  George, Roger Z. 2007. Studies in Intelligence, 51(3) 
6   Marrin, Stephen P. 2007. Intelligence and National Security, 2(1), 828 
7   Firestone, Joseph M and McElroy, Mark W. 2003. Key issues in the New Knowledge Management, 327 
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Analysis as a discipline or profession and to what extent it has adapted or not, to the new 
context. The purpose was to develop an overview or bird’s eye view of this landscape and not 
delve in the details, many of which might prove to be interesting research topics in 
themselves. Challenges in this new landscape that will be addressed are: 
- understanding the concepts and distinctive vocabularies of the new landscape;  
- understanding the changed world;  
- evaluating current analytical methodologies to determine their aptness for the new 
landscape and 
- reinventing Intelligence Analysis by adapting paradigms, concepts and practices 
from Knowledge Management that suit the new reality more appropriately.  
1.2 Literature study 
The literature study in itself was challenging as the viewpoints of scholars and leaders had to 
be brought together to address the wide scope of the research question, without going into too 
much depth. Although Knowledge Management has grown rapidly as a multidimensional 
discipline during the last 20 years with contributions by various scholars, publications in 
journals, and an emerging epistemology, Intelligence Analysis is still very young and 
disorganised. To a significant degree, scholars and practitioners still disagree on definitions 
and taxonomies and whether intelligence can justifiably be recognised as a discipline.8 
Despite this, the body of knowledge in the field of Intelligence Analysis has grown 
exponentially over the last 7 years, fuelled by intelligence-relevant events and the increased 
interaction between scholars and practitioners. There is sufficient overt and academic material 
available that makes the use of covert or classified material for this type of study unnecessary.    
The “father of Intelligence Analysis”, Sherman Kent, in 1955 stated that although intelligence 
has taken on the aspects of a discipline with a recognisable methodology, vocabulary, and a 
body of theory, doctrine and techniques, it lacked literature.9 Fifty years later, literature on 
                                                 
8  There are three international peer-reviewed journals dedicated to intelligence and intelligence studies, while 
various other journals in the social and technological sciences publish intelligence-related articles regularly. 
At least 30 public and private universities and colleges worldwide offer intelligence as undergraduate and 
postgraduate studies, some of them solely dedicated to Intelligence Analysis, while there are at least five 
professional intelligence organisations, some with their own professional certification processes. Most 
intelligence organisations in the traditional secret governmental domain have their own training institutions. 
Other interest groups loosely associated by their interest in intelligence matters, not necessarily aiming at 
professionalism, number about 45. See http://www.iafie.org  
9  Kent, Sherman. 1955. Studies in Intelligence 1(1),1.  Kent, a former Yale history professor who became the 
head of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates, had a major influence on the practice and academic study 
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intelligence and Intelligence Analysis continues to favour practice to theory, and there are 
constant debates on the feasibility of standardising intelligence theory. Marrin10 posits two 
reasons for the failure to develop intelligence theory: 1) the fact that consensus has not yet 
been reached on definitions which are the precursors for theory formulation, and 2) as 
intelligence is an applied field, the practitioner has a natural “distaste for theorising”. Another 
reason for the “absence” of an agreed-upon theory on intelligence might be the postmodernist 
rejection in the search for grand, unified theories of society as well as knowledge in favour of 
fragmented “world-views”.11   
A limiting research factor is the fact that the literature on intelligence and Intelligence 
Analysis in particular, focuses mostly on current events and the discipline as espoused in the 
United States, and to a lesser extent in some European countries and Australia. Very little has 
been written on intelligence in Africa from an African perspective. Despite these 
manifestations, the rapidly growing literature on Intelligence Analysis (albeit mostly based on 
the discipline in the US) provides a realistic picture of this evolving practice and academic 
discipline. The debate on the future of Intelligence Analysis in the US is, understandably, 
universally relevant. This thesis therefore presents both current and future trends, as well as 
issues and methodologies which, if not already a reality, will in due course become so for 
most intelligence analysts and their organisations, also in South Africa. 
The author’s interaction with intelligence organisations from other countries has confirmed 
that intelligence analysts worldwide experience common problems and face similar 
challenges. These include the understanding and interpretation by management of the nature 
of intelligence and therefore the effective use of analysis in decision-making as well as the 
level of knowledge and application of analysis methodologies, tools and techniques for 
different clients, contexts and intelligence products.12  
                                                                                                                                                        
of Intelligence Analysis. His book, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, written in 1949 and 
reprinted, was instrumental in formalising analytical tradecraft and methodologies. The CIA named its 
analysis training institute after Kent. 
10  Marrin, Stephen P. 2007. Intelligence and National Security, 2(1), 822 
11  Rathmell, Andrew. 2002. Intelligence and National Security 17 (3), 97-104  
12  Disclosure: The author’s career in the South African civilian intelligence and membership of professional 
international intelligence organisations required liaising with intelligence analysts and/or their managers 
from all domains of intelligence (foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, law enforcement, military and 
business) from countries such as the US, UK, Netherlands, Mexico, Cuba, India, Australia, Ireland, 
Northern Ireland, Nigeria, Namibia, Chile and others. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
New vocabulary and concepts 
 
So how, apart from adapting to a new vocabulary, is the intelligence community going to 
achieve the transformation it advocates? 
Linda Popova13 
 
This chapter aims at establishing a conceptual basis from which Intelligence Analysis in the 
Knowledge Age can be understood. Firstly, intelligence and related terminologies are 
explained, after which intelligence in the recent South African context is discussed to anchor 
later recommendations for the African context. Knowledge Management (KM) concepts are 
then dealt with, focusing on the three so-called generations of KM, and referring to relevant 
Intelligence Analysis practices. In conclusion, Intelligence Analysis is defined as knowledge 
work, which has implications for the way the discipline and its practitioners are regarded.   
2.1 Intelligence  
Intelligence is sometimes described as a “much abused” term in both scholarly literature and 
official discourse. This is in part due to the fact that national and institutional differences of 
perspective exist, complicating the search for definitions.14 Broadly speaking, intelligence can 
be defined in three contexts: 
2.1.1 Intelligence as organisation15  
Here intelligence refers to those functional organisations established by national law (or not) 
to conduct activities related to information-obtaining or denying the associated secret means 
by which this is done. Waltz coined a new term, the “intelligence enterprise” which includes 
the collection of people, knowledge (both internally tacit and explicitly codified), 
                                                 
13  Popova, Linda. 2008. Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: From Government to Business Enterprise. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Reports/The-Revolution-in-Intelligence-
Affairs/Analysis/  
14  Rathmell, Andrew. 2002. Intelligence and National Security 17(3), 97-104  
15  Shulsky, Abram N. 1993. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3 and Lowenthal,  
Mark M. 2003. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 9, Goldman, Jan. 2006. Words of Intelligence: A 
dictionary, 78-79 
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infrastructure, and information processes that deliver critical knowledge (intelligence) to the 
customers. This intelligence enables them to make accurate, timely and informed decisions to 
accomplish the mission of the enterprise.16   
Lowenthal17 states that the main role of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty, which is 
problematic in itself. Policy or decision-makers usually want to know what is happening as 
well as what is likely to happen. More often than not, they require that intelligence 
organisations tell them exactly what is going to happen, ignoring the fact that intelligence 
does not exist to provide definitive answers or necessarily to point to winning or losing policy 
choices. He cites four reasons18 why intelligence organisations exist: 
- To avoid “strategic surprises” - those threats, forces, events and developments that 
are capable of threatening a nation’s existence, and are mostly totally unexpected. 
Most of these surprises were of a military nature in the past, such as the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973. He contrasts these with tactical surprises, where there are 
signals or forewarnings of possible events, such as the 11 September 2001 US 
terrorist attacks where there were indications of heightened activity and threats but 
not sufficient collection and sharing of intelligence. Quite a lot has been written 
about intelligence “failures” since the attacks, mostly by those outside the 
intelligence arena who argue that the intelligence community in the US, and 
elsewhere, failed in their task. The reality, however, is that the complex interplay 
of various factors contributes to the imperfect nature of intelligence warning.19 
These include limited collection (such as insufficient penetration of targets), faulty 
and incomplete analysis, the nature of communicating nuances of uncertainty, the 
decision-maker’s own perception and policy preferences, and organisational and 
                                                 
16  Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 17 
17  Lowenthal, Mark M. 2008. Intelligence and National Security, 23(3), 313 
18  Lowenthal, Mark M. 2003. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2-5 
19  See the analysis of Dahl, Erik. 2004. Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against 
terrorism where he critiques the “traditional” views of intelligence failures as aspects relating to the 
decision-maker, the intelligence itself, the deception of enemies, and the “information age optimist” view 
that better collaboration, data mining and technological tools might prevent intelligence failures. He 
proposes the use of the “Normal Accident Theory” of Perrow who argues that accidents and failures in 
complex, tightly coupled systems are inevitable, largely because it is impossible to anticipate all possible 
failures. Dahl states that efforts to improve the intelligence system are just as likely to make things worse 
than improve them and that much of current intelligence theory may be misguided in its emphasis on 
psychological factors and problems of cognition. His conclusion is that normal accident theory suggests 
that while intelligence failures may be caused by the classic problems of intelligence, the inevitability of 
failure may be the result of the complex nature of the intelligence system, 71 
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cultural issues. Lowenthal proposed a “recalibrating of expectations”20  of what 
intelligence can do. 
- To provide long-term expertise and stability to political appointees and decision-
makers whose terms of office are often short-lived.  
- To support the policy process because policy makers and decision-makers 
constantly need tailored and timely intelligence that will provide background, 
context, information and warning, as well as an assessment of the risks, benefits 
and the likely outcomes. The extent of support to the policy process differs from 
country to country, but in most democracies there is a strict dividing line between 
politics and intelligence. Although politicians are allowed to cross this line by 
dismissing, ignoring or offering their own intelligence, intelligence officers must 
maintain their distance and may not enforce specific policy outcomes or choices. 
- To maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods. Whether in national 
security/governmental context or in business, information exists that is not readily 
available through overt means and which is crucial to the organisation’s overall 
success. Intelligence organisations or units exist both to protect those secrets from 
disclosure to competitors and attempt at obtaining them from counterparts. Most 
national security intelligence organisations monopolise secrets for the government 
and its secret services. The irony is that governments have never been the sole 
custodians of secrets or intelligence. Collecting secrets from human sources are 
not unique to governments and their intelligence agencies as individuals and 
business have done that for centuries to survive or prosper. It is estimated that up 
to 95% of all intelligence is available from overt sources, at least since the 1990s 
with the commencement of the Information Revolution.21 A grey area, however, is 
that of obtaining secrets by clandestine means. In many countries, also in South 
Africa, only government agencies are allowed by law to obtain information 
through interception and other technical measures. However, the technology is 
now freely available, and statutory limitations have limited impact where 
(outdated) laws are not enforced.   
                                                 
20  Lowenthal, Mark M. 2008. Intelligence and National Security, 23(3), 314 
21  Steele, Robert D. 2002(a). The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political, 148 
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sources25 and provide the raw information to the processing divisions responsible for the 
translation or decryption (if necessary). The information is then indexed and captured in the 
databases before this processed information is forwarded to the analysis divisions where they 
evaluate the information according to reliability, timeliness and relevance to the original 
tasking. The information is thereupon analysed and intelligence products drafted according to 
a preset product range extending across current, operational or strategic “finished” 
intelligence. These products are then disseminated, usually in written format or briefings to 
the consumer/client. 
There has, understandably, been much criticism over the past eight years or so in the 
intelligence community and academia of the accuracy of the “cyclical” framework. Some of 
the criticisms voiced were that in reality there is little, if any interaction between the decision-
makers and the intelligence producers. Decision-makers do not “give guidance” or stipulate 
their requirements. Collection divisions would also often not wait for tasking or collection 
plans; they are sometimes the first to identify salient issues and report on them. Collection and 
analysis therefore usually work in tandem, and not sequentially. In crisis situations, some 
steps in the intelligence cycle are by-passed, creating half-finished or unfinished intelligence 
products. In many instances, especially in those countries and cultures where there is no 
separate, dedicated analytical function, or where extreme need-to-know silos exist, all 
information does not enter the cycle, but might go directly to the decision-maker.26 More 
often than not, the analysis function’s interpretative role in the traditional cycle has created an 
elitist attitude and arrogance among analysts and their managers. Analysts like to call 
themselves the “nexus” of the intelligence process, forgetting that without good information 
from grassroots level, there will be little to analyse.  
Treverton’s real intelligence cycle27 (Figure 2) is driven by intelligence “pushing”, and not by 
policy “pulling”. He excludes the decision-maker from the process as the latter does not have 
the time or patience to articulate his requirements. In this model, the intelligence organisation 
                                                 
25  Sources of information can be divided in two main categories: 1) open and 2) covert. Open, readily 
available human and technical source intelligence (OSINT), is the mainstay of intelligence collection. 
Covert sources include HUMINT (of which the most risky and difficult are human sources, either 
occasional or clandestine/under-cover) and TECHINT (information from technical sources which includes 
imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (electromagnetic signals for electronic data – SIGINT), 
and measurements and signatures intelligence (typically to do with the range of sonar detection applications 
– MASINT). 
26  See Hulnick, Arthur S. 2006. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6), 962 and De Valk, Guillaume. 2005. 
Dutch Intelligence - Towards a Qualitative Framework for Analysis. 13, 14 
27  Treverton, Gregory F. 2001. Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information, 106 
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The Production section focuses on the process of producing intelligence products. This 
section of the model deals with numerous and complex factors that influence the act of 
analysis. These are: 1) the capabilities an analyst brings to the task - a stock, usually an 
increasing one, that is derived from an analyst’s education, training and experience; 2) the 
number and frequency of evaluations and reviews of products that have a constraining effect 
on the timeliness and relevance of a product, especially when it is of immediate concern; 3) 
political and cultural values of the organisation which also have a constraining effect; 4) the 
amount of relevant, usable data (a stock) available which is in turn influenced by a variety of 
other people, organisations, systems and technologies. This process is represented by the 
stock-and-flow chain that appears across the middle of the diagram.  
The Product Influences section is in actual fact the feedback loop of the system where the 
consumer responds to a delivered product, revising his initial requirements and setting the 
systemic phases in action again.31  
Each iteration of the process is different, because those inside the system have changed due to 
their interaction with one another and the variables in the system, whether with the customer, 
the topic area, or the organisation and its processes. The changes are a manifestation of the 
concept that the system is greater than the sum of its parts.  
From yet another perspective on intelligence as a process, Clarke32 designed a target-centric 
approach (figure 4) which is not a linear process or a cycle (despite the many feedback loops 
within) but a network-centric collaborative process. In this model, the goal is to construct a 
shared picture of the target from which all participants in the process can extract those 
elements they need to do their job and contribute from their own contexts to create a more 
accurate picture of the target.  
The process would start with the problem the customers have regarding the current picture of 
the target (left middle element) and identify information needs. Analysts and collectors 
together share the same target picture and translate those needs into knowledge gaps or 
information requirements for those collectors to address. As collectors obtain the needed 
                                                 
31  It is interesting to note that Johnston is of the opinion that the consumer does actually provide feedback. 
The reality for most analysts is that there is hardly ever feedback, and that the system kicks into action due 
to various reasons, i.e. environmental scanning by either the analyst or the collector through which a new 
issue or trend is identified, new information or insights gained that change the value, context or impact of 
existing information, or when an anticipated future need of the client is identified by the intelligence 
officer. 
32  Clark, Robert M.  2003. Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 17-27 
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2.1.3 Intelligence as a product35  
The third context in which intelligence can be defined is that of the product of these 
processes; a body of information and conclusions drawn from that which is acquired and 
furnished in response to the known or perceived requirements of a client. It is often derived 
from information that may be concealed or that is not intended to be available for use by the 
acquirer. 
In Intelligence Analysis, there are three types of intelligence products: 
- Operational intelligence, which assists and directs the collection or investigation 
on an ongoing basis and where the analyst is usually part of the investigating team. 
Typical products include memorandums, operational plans and status reports, as 
well as visual analytical aids such as network/association charts, etc. 
- Current intelligence, which contextualises “snapshots” of an event or issue for the 
client and ranges in length from between a paragraph to two to three pages. 
- Strategic intelligence which provides the client with estimative and/or warning by 
presenting medium- to long-term analyses on the nature, dynamics and impact of 
an event or issue. Some clients prefer analyses that spell out options as well as 
their possible consequences, while others prefer only to have the analyst’s input on 
an issue without policy “advice”.  
The focus on the “product” or output context of intelligence broadens the definition of 
intelligence to include that specific type of information that has been analysed and evaluated 
and which provides foreknowledge to a client or decision-maker. This expands the actors, 
rules and tradecraft beyond the traditional nation-state viewpoint. Waltz36  broadens the 
scope of intelligence to include other sectors by defining intelligence as “that knowledge that 
is deemed most critical for decision-making both in the nation-state and in business. In each 
case, intelligence is required to develop policy and strategy and for implementation in 
operations and tactics.” Wheaton37 succinctly defines intelligence as “an information picture 
that is useful to a decision-maker”, opening up the application of intelligence to any sector 
                                                 
35  Shulsky, Abram N. 1993. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3 and Lowenthal,  
Mark M. 2003. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 9, Goldman, Jan. 2006. Words of Intelligence: A 
dictionary, 78-79 
36  Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 1 
37  Wheaton, Kristan J. 2001. The Warning Solution: Intelligence Analysis in the Age of Information Overload, 
8 
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that needs and applies this information product context. However, with the broadening of the 
concept of intelligence, it has lost some of its original meaning and “flattened” as well. 
According to Agrell38 the term “intelligence” has become a management catchword and he 
describes how information processing skills, media press cuttings and marketing have been 
renamed “intelligence”. Other examples where “intelligence” is confused with “information” 
is in the field of informatics, research or even electronic and hard-copy information 
dissemination for specific interest groups like designers, architects, computer professionals 
and even for interactive entertainment research purposes.39 
Business, however, has looked beyond and is now applying (and has probably done so for a 
very long time) intelligence as a management tool.40 George Friedman, a former CIA analyst 
who started the respected private intelligence organisation, Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) in 
the 1990s, explains in his book The Intelligence Edge: How to profit in the Information Age 
how the same intelligence principles also apply in the business domain. He uses the example 
of “Chief Knowledge Officers” whose task is identical to that of the head of an intelligence 
service that requires maximising the efficiency of data collection, collation and analysis. He 
calls these types of businesses intelligence agencies, dedicated to collecting information and 
turning it into knowledge.41 Together with strategic planning, intelligence in the business 
context provides knowledge and foreknowledge about current and emerging markets, 
technology, competitors and trends.  
The dilemma with a broader definition of intelligence is that it increases the complexity of the 
system by including other, non-traditional role-players which import new dynamics as well as 
problems. On the one hand, an elitist, narrow approach is outdated as it is ignorant of the new 
environment and alienates other disciplines and theories from which intelligence and 
specifically Intelligence Analysis could learn. On the other hand, regarding mostly anything 
as intelligence, as indicated earlier, creates the danger of it becoming irrelevant. Intelligence, 
whether secret or open, governmental or privatised, will nonetheless remain an instrument of 
power and influence, even more so now in the Knowledge Age.  
                                                 
38  Agrell, Wilhelm. 2002. Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers, 1(4),5  
39  See http://www.di.net; http://www.dfcint.com, http://www.intelligence.co.za etc. 
40  Meyer, H.E. 1991. Real-World Intelligence: Organized Information for Executives, 7 
41  Friedman, George, et al.1997. The Intelligence Edge; How to profit in the Information Age, 2-4 
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Aspiring to find the middle ground in this debate, intelligence, for purposes of this thesis, is 
the result of a rigorous process that provides the decision-maker in all domains with 
knowledge and foreknowledge on priority issues.   
2.2 Intelligence in the recent South African Context  
The South African intelligence history is closely related to its political history. Most of the 
emphasis since 1994 is on the “cloak and dagger”, dark side of intelligence and not on the 
professional, decision-making support aspect. The literature on South African intelligence is 
also sparse, and mostly focuses on the transition period and oversight issues. The new 
democratic government has found it difficult to define intelligence in the new constitutional 
democratic context. None of the Acts passed since 1994 provides a clear definition of what 
“intelligence” constitutes, but emphasises that intelligence is secret and should serve “national 
security”.     
Only the White Paper on Intelligence gives a definition – using the product as a contextual 
definition of intelligence by stating that “intelligence refers to the product resulting from the 
collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information, 
supportive of the policy- and decision-making processes pertaining to the national goals of 
stability, security and development. Modern intelligence can thus be described as organised 
policy related information, including secret information.”42  
In view of the definition of intelligence put forward in this thesis, the above definition, which 
regards intelligence as decision-making support, is considered as positive. However, it has 
two inherent weaknesses: 1) the fact that a White Paper has no statutory status, and 2) that the 
statement of “national goals of stability, security and development” places the government 
structures in control of what those goals constitute. In government circles, intelligence is still 
equated with spying and secrecy, both which are regarded as key state security functions.43 
The broadening of the intelligence concept has not yet taken root in the South African 
governmental sector.  
The government’s official viewpoint is out of touch with the Constitution, as well as with 
reality. Firstly, the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence in a Constitutional 
Democracy states that the Constitution views national security in a comprehensive and 
                                                 
42  White Paper on Intelligence. 1995 
43  Butt, Stephan Grant. 2007. University of Cape Town, Department of Political Studies Masters Thesis 
Presentation, 2 
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holistic fashion that is much broader than a narrow concept of state security, territorial 
integrity and law and order44 apparent in the relevant Acts. Also, parallel to international 
trends, “private intelligence organisations” have grown dramatically, offering a range of 
products and services which include investigations, political and security risk analysis, 
espionage and counterespionage, surveillance services and corporate competitive intelligence 
to a diversity of clients. The latter include governments (often the South African government), 
businesses and individuals.45 Competitive intelligence especially, has grown significantly by 
at least 30% within the larger companies in South Africa that currently perform some form of 
intelligence. This is apparent when compared with a mere handful that existed in the early 
1990s.46  
In 2003 the accusations by the former Minister of Intelligence, Lindiwe Sisulu, that foreign 
intelligence agencies might use local companies as fronts,47 led to a ministerial review of the 
private intelligence industry. Various companies providing Intelligence Analysis in the risk 
and competitive intelligence environments made submissions to the ministry, but the review 
panel’s activities were suspended without providing any reason later the same year. In a 
promising development, during the Parliamentary Intelligence Legislation Committee on 30 
September 2008, the committee heard that the State’s legal advisers did not have any problem 
with other intelligence structures per se as it is difficult to define what a private intelligence 
company is. Their approach was rather to define those illegal activities that posed a problem 
to the State security as opposed to those companies that collected overt information to provide 
strategic support.48 Such a level-headed approach is aligned with the essence contained in the 
Constitution and might even pave the way for better cooperation between government 
structures and private intelligence organisations in fulfilling a critical decision-making 
support function. 
                                                 
44  The Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy, 2008, 52. It was not 
the scope of the Commission to review the definition of intelligence but to analyse the extent to which the 
government intelligence structures are subservient to the Constitution. 
45  Butt, Stephan Grant. 2007. University of Cape Town, Department of Political Studies Masters Thesis 
Presentation, 3 
46  Whitehead, Steve. 2008. Personal correspondence, Director: Corporate Business Insight and Awareness, 9 
January    
47  Sisulu, Lindiwe. 2003. Intelligence Department Budget Vote Speech, South African National Assembly, 17 
June, 6 
48  Parliament of South Africa. 2008. Intelligence Services Amendment Bill, National Strategic Intelligence 
Amendment Bill & Protection of Information Bill. Meeting Report Information.  
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The government’s mistrust of private intelligence organisations is compounded by illegal 
activities by some of these private intelligence organisations, unlawful access to State 
information and, specifically, information peddling where false information is deliberately 
passed on to security and intelligence structures.49 Although not relevant to this thesis, it is 
significant that the abuse of the intelligence structures of the government for political 
purposes will most probably remain a problem in South Africa, unless there is more public 
debate, and proper constitutional checks and balances introduced. The Billy Masetlha and 
Zuma Tapes affair, the resulting court cases and the media coverage on the politicisation of 
intelligence structures, highlighted the damage to the stature and credibility of the intelligence 
community.50   
A positive outcome of these unfortunate events is the media coverage on the nature of 
intelligence, the role of the government and other private intelligence structures as well as the 
supremacy of the Constitution in this regard. The debate and extent of public consultation on 
a rethink of intelligence will unfortunately be dictated by government, which does not bode 
well for the process.  
2.3 Knowledge and the Knowledge Age  
While the millennia-old epistemological debate on knowledge and knowledge processes 
continues, it might be useful to look at the difference between data, information and 
knowledge in brief. The Bennets51 distinguish between these three concepts by stating that:   
“… data is discrete, objective facts about events which include numbers, letters and images 
without context, while information is data with some level of meaning as it describes a 
situation or condition. Knowledge is built on data and information, and is created within the 
individual. This knowledge represents understanding of the context, insights into the 
relationships within a system and the ability to identify leverage points and weaknesses and to 
understand the future implications of actions taken to resolve problems”.  
                                                 
49  The most recent case is the Browse Mole report, which allegedly contained information that was obtained 
illegally by the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO – which does not have an intelligence mandate) 
from private intelligence companies. The information related a conspiratorial attempt by high ranking 
South African and other African leaders to get ANC president Jacob Zuma in power. The Parliamentary 
committee found that a private intelligence organisation sold this information to the DSO. See National 
Assembly and National Council of Province. 2007. Committee Reports: Browse mole report.  
50  For detailed discussion on the politicisation issue see Malala, Justice. 2007. Games leaders play. Sowetan. 4 
June 2007, Hutton, Lauren. 2007. South Africa: Smoke, Waiting for the fire? ISS Today. 23 March 2007 
and Hutton, Lauren. 2007, The state of democracy in South Africa. ISS Today. 19 November 2007 and 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-09-the-spy-who-saved-zuma.  
51  Bennet, Alex and David. 2003. Handbook on Knowledge Management 1: Knowledge matters, 8 
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 In this thesis, knowledge is defined as the human capacity to take effective action in varied 
and uncertain situations.52   
We are living in an age where the landscape is characterised by accelerating change, rising 
uncertainty and increasing complexities.53 To a large extent our survival depends on our 
ability to understand, interpret and act, using our skills, experience and knowledge. Peter 
Drucker defines this Age as one in which the means of production is Knowledge54 – the 
Knowledge Age. Unlike the Industrial and more recently the Information Revolution, with all 
its technological advances and resultant information overload, the central theme of the 
Knowledge Age is that all the information is useless unless it is interpreted and acted upon by 
the cerebral competencies and capacities of the new society. Drucker’s maxim “Knowledge is 
being applied to knowledge itself”55 is embodied in the fact that knowledge is a utility which 
is applied for two purposes: to determine how existing knowledge can be applied to be more 
effective (productive) and to define the need and then produce new knowledge (innovation). 
In the Knowledge Age, hierarchical structures are replaced with networks, Taylorist 
management practices with lower-level tiers, distributed decision-making and corporate 
loyalties with autonomous knowledge workers. This has far-reaching implications for all 
organisations, but more so for those whose core business is the creation, distribution or 
application of knowledge. According to Drucker,56 the main economic challenge of the 
Knowledge Age will be the productivity of knowledge work and specifically that of the 
knowledge workers, because for the first time in history, they own both the means and tools 
of production.   
To meet the challenge of productivity in the new economy, knowledge work has to result in 
action. Knowledge processes, systems and tools are utilised to continually make choices 
between countless options, without knowing what consequences those decisions might have 
in an increasingly interdependent world. As a result, decision-making has become 
increasingly complex and difficult, even more so for knowledge organisations. New 
                                                 
52   Bennet, Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex 
Adaptive System, 5 
53  Bennet, Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex 
Adaptive System, 17 
54  Drucker, Peter. 1994. Post-Capitalist Society, 8 
55  Drucker, Peter. 1994. Post-Capitalist Society, 42 
56  Drucker, Peter. 1994. Post-Capitalist Society, 8 
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vocabularies, management techniques, technologies and strategies are imperative to prosper in 
the Knowledge Era.57   
Yick goes so far as to say that we are entering an intelligence era where the individual’s mind 
and intelligence (not to be confused with intelligence as forewarning) is the centre and where 
organisations should organise themselves around this intelligence to utilise the intrinsic 
intelligence and knowledge structures in the individual and collective minds more 
effectively.58 
2.4 The Knowledge worker   
It is clear that the Knowledge Age requires a very specific type of person who will be able to 
adapt to the constant change and its associated challenges. Thomas Davenport59 defines 
knowledge workers as those people who “think for a living”.   
Recent research has focused on those skills and attributes that such “knowledge workers” 
should have. They have significant degrees of expertise, education or experience, and the 
primary purpose of their jobs involves the creation, distribution or application of knowledge –
making sense, interpreting and understanding. Due to their emergent and intellectually 
divergent but also interdependent types of work, they have to collaborate with others across 
functional, organisational and national borders to resolve and comprehend complex problems 
and situations.   
Knowledge workers generally feel that traditional management and organisational practices 
such as Taylorist hierarchies, functional compartmentalisation, and bureaucratic politics, stifle 
their effectiveness. This has far–reaching implications for motivating and managing such 
workers. Their work is less structured, for example, than that required by administrative or 
production work and they are loyal to their profession, rather than to a company. They are 
mobile and focus on gaining experiences that will position them well for future opportunities 
– often in new companies or even new countries.    
                                                 
57  Stewart, Thomas A. 2001. The Wealth of Knowledge: Intellectual Capital and the Twenty-first Century 
Organization, 5 
58  Yick, Liang Thow. 2004. Organizing Around Intelligence, 3-21 
59  Davenport, Thomas H. 2005. Thinking for a living: how to get better performance and results from 
knowledge workers, 10-15 
21 
 
In her research, Alison Kidd60 found that knowledge workers solve problems and generate 
different outputs mainly as a result of internal changes and perpetual “configuration” of their 
thinking and learning, rather than those of external rules and procedures. Because of this, their 
outputs are different every time, thereby perpetuating the constant flux in which the 
organisation finds itself. This is not true of other kinds of workers where there are templates, 
rules and standard operating procedures that are followed to achieve organisational objectives.  
The personal attributes of knowledge workers should ideally include the following:61  
- They can work in multiple domains simultaneously, moving in and out of them, 
continuously expanding their knowledge, capabilities, perceptions, capacities and 
networks. 
- They manage knowledge in the sense of recognising, creating, finding and moving 
knowledge that is valid, useful and applicable to the issue at hand. They can create 
ideas, solve problems, make decisions and take effective action, either individually 
or as a group. 
- They have foresight to sense the future knowledge needs and acquire that 
knowledge to handle challenging problems well before they arise. Their 
understanding of systems and complexities helps them to identify possible future 
knowledge needs. 
- They are ongoing learners who have sound discipline, knowledge and a broad 
competency that spans many dimensions. This implies that they realise that they 
cannot be experts in all domains and are therefore willing to forego their 
perspectives and beliefs to adopt a broader understanding of an issue at hand.   
- They are convergent thinkers who have knowledge of systems, complexities and 
critical thinking and who can use different approaches and techniques to better 
understand complex issues. 
- They develop and nurture their relationship networks to gain knowledge and 
actions in new environments.  
                                                 
60  Kidd, Alison. 1994. Proceedings: ACM CHI'94: Human Factors in Computing Systems, Boston, Mass, 24-
28 April 1994, 186-187 
61  Bennet, Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex 
Adaptive System, 213-226 
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- They are information literate. They know how to find, evaluate and use 
information effectively to solve a particular problem or make a decision.    
- In knowledge organisations, where change happens rapidly and the creation and 
use of knowledge to gain a competitive advantage is paramount, the knowledge 
workers will spend more time learning, thinking and collaborating and less time 
applying what they already know. 
2.5 The generations of Knowledge Management 
In a widely accepted analysis of KM theories and practices, Snowden defined three distinct 
movements or generations of Knowledge Management in 2002.62 
2.5.1  The first generation of Knowledge Management 
The first generation of Knowledge Management dates back prior to 1995. It focused on 
computer-based business process re-engineering and the structuring and flow of information 
in databases and information systems to support decision-making. The catch phrase “the right 
information in the right place at the right time” is still widely used today to market 
intelligence or information-based repositories. Knowledge was, in this generation, viewed as a 
thing or object to be managed and distributed – the management of information phase. Here, 
“knowledge” is in fact data or information without human interaction and contextualisation. 
In an Intelligence Analysis context, the raw information obtained through technical means 
like Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) or economic data from a competitor’s sales revenues or 
crime statistics would qualify as first generation “knowledge”. Software companies, wishing 
to bolster sales, would advertise that the outcome of their algorithms is “intelligence”. 
2.5.2 The second generation of Knowledge Management   
The second generation of Knowledge Management stretching over a period from1995 to the 
beginning of the twenty-first century focused on the management of people and of knowledge 
processes. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s SECI model (see Figure 5) of the conversion of 
tacit/explicit knowledge served as the theoretical basis for this generation. The SECI model’s 
quadrants of Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and Internalisation attempted to 
explain the flow of knowledge; however, the model was simplified by practitioners to be more 
digestible in an industry where knowledge was still required to be measurable and therefore 
manageable. In the domain of Intelligence Analysis, the focus was about the process of 
brainstorming an intelligence problem and then writing (codifying) the analyst’s tacit 
                                                 
62  Snowden, David. 2002. Journal of Knowledge Management. 6(2), 100-111  
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the fact that “there is no conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge; there never has 
been and never will be”.66 
2.5.3 The third generation of Knowledge Management 
This definition of the thesis that “knowledge is the human capacity to take effective action in 
varied and uncertain situations” finds itself in the so-called third generation or Next 
Generation of Knowledge Management. The concept of the third generation started around 
2001 with Stacey and Snowden’s notion that knowledge should be managed as both a “thing” 
and a “flow”.  
They base their theories and models on the principles of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), a 
version of the complexity theory. Cilliers67 summarises the thirteen characteristics of 
complexity as follows: 
- Complex systems are open systems which make the context in which they operate 
as important as the characteristics of the systems themselves. 
- They operate under conditions not at equilibrium. 
- Complex systems consist of many components; some of them are often simple or 
can be treated as such. 
- The output of components is a function of their input. At least some of the 
functions must be non-linear. 
- The state of the system is determined by the values of the input and outputs. 
- Interactions are defined by actual input-output relationships and they are dynamic 
(as they change over time). 
- Components interact with many others, there are often multiple routes possible 
between components, which are mediated in different ways. 
- Some sequences of interaction will provide feedback routes, whether long or short. 
- Complex systems display behaviour that results from the interaction among and 
between components and not from characteristics inherent to the components 
themselves – the so-called characteristic of emergence. 
                                                 
66  Firestone, Joseph M and McElroy, Mark W. 2003. Key issues in the New Knowledge Management. 324 
67  Cilliers, Paul in Aaltonen, Mika. 2007. The Third Lens: multi-ontology sense-making and strategic 
decision-making, 100-101 
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- An asymmetrical structure (temporal, spatial and functional organisation) is 
developed, maintained and adapted in complex systems through internal dynamic 
processes. 
- Complex systems display behaviour over a divergent range of timescales in order 
to cope with their ever-changing environment. They must adapt to changes 
quickly, but  can also sustain themselves if a part of the system changes at a lower 
rate than the environment. The latter is seen as the “memory” of the system. 
- The behaviour and characteristics of complex systems unfold over time. The 
history of the system co-determines the current behaviour of the system. 
- More than one description of a complex system is possible. Different descriptions 
will decompose the system in different ways, which may also display different 
degrees of complexity. 
To survive in this complex environment, organisations should have the core competencies of: 
1) creating new ideas, 2) solving problems, 3) making decisions, and 4) taking action to 
achieve a desired result – knowledge being the driving force behind each of these 
processes/competencies.68 Complex Adaptive Systems therefore exist and operate in perpetual 
flux, moving uncertainly between different degrees of stability and instability, depending on 
the context and impact of internal and external events on relationships with internal and 
external agents and systems.  
Stacey critiques the previously described first and second generations by saying that they are 
based on the perception of an outside observer that designs in advance, and then manipulates 
the systems from a macro, external position. Seen from the perspective of the complexity 
theory, this is impossible, as observers are also part of the system which they try to describe 
or manage and therefore unable to be objective or removed from the interactions with and 
dynamics of a system. Returning to a definition of knowledge, Stacey69 states that it is neither 
stored nor shared because it is not an “it” but an ephemeral, active process of relating. 
Knowledge, according to Stacey, “cannot be managed, and there is no need to manage it, 
because knowledge is participative self organising processes patterning themselves in 
coherent ways”.  
                                                 
68  Bennet, Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex 
Adaptive System, 27- 29 
69  Stacey, R.D. 2001. Complex Responsive Processes in Organisations, 3, 4, 229 – 235 
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Snowden70 agrees and indicates that the second generation prescriptive paradigm is flawed, 
that knowledge is contextual and that our thinking about knowledge should change for the 
following reasons: 
- Knowledge can only be volunteered, it cannot be conscripted. People will not 
share knowledge if they do not wish to. No technique, motivation or rewards have 
been able to change this. This explains why knowledge-sharing drives and other 
organisational incentives associated with the second KM Generation did not have 
the desired effect. 
- We can always know more than we can tell and we will always tell more than we 
can write down. The nature of knowledge is such that we always know, or are 
capable of knowing more than we have the physical time or the conceptual ability 
to verbalise. Writing something down is reflective knowledge that is time-
consuming and involves loss of control over its subsequent use.   
- We only know what we know when we need to know it. Human knowledge is 
deeply contextual, and is triggered by circumstance. In understanding what people 
know, we have to recreate the context and then ask a meaningful question to 
enable the use of knowledge. This strengthens Cilliers’ notion of the importance of 
a system’s context in trying to understand it better and also impacts on the 
intelligence analyst’s efforts to make sense of threats and issues.  
Using the contextual, interaction, flow and emergence principles of complexity and CAS, 
Snowden designed the Cynefin framework71 (figure 6) in an attempt to argue against “single 
or idealised models” where cause and effect are clear and where something is either ordered 
or un-ordered. Snowden argues that things are both ordered and un-ordered at once, because 
in reality “order and un-order intertwine and interact”72, and that makes sensing and acting 
difficult.  
                                                 
70  Snowden, David. 2002. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(2), 6 
71  Snowden, David. 2002. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(2), 17  
72  Kurz, CF. and Snowden, D. 2003. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3), 466 
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Figure 6: Snowden's Cynefin model73 
The Cynefin framework explains how organisations and decision-makers move within and 
across different spaces or domains; applying knowledge both as a “thing” and a “flow” in an 
effort to makes sense. To describe this movement of relating processes and contexts, he uses 
four domains to explain the various cultural, leadership, or decision-making aspects and the 
manner in which agents or systems flow, depending on the interactions and contexts: 
- Known domain: Where the cause and effect are known, repeatable and predictable. 
Decisions can be made and actions taken according to standard operating 
procedures, doctrine and best practice. The mode of action here is following 
doctrine through sensing, categorising and responding. 
- Knowable domain: Where information that is not fully known at present, can be 
known given enough time, resources and research. Here groups of professionals or 
experts can create and share knowledge and clarity is achieved through analysis. 
When there is uncertainty, scenario construction is performed by creating a 
domain where several good solutions are applicable. The mode of action here is 
analysis by sensing, analysing and responding. 
                                                 
73  Kurz, CF. and Snowden, D. 2003. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3), 468. 
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- Complex domain: Here it is difficult to discern a pattern, or even identify factors 
constituting a pattern. Cause and effect are only coherent in retrospect. These 
patterns do not repeat as issues and problems emerge and return in different forms. 
Collaboration and different perspectives lead to a better understanding of the 
complex information; contexts and solutions to problems are emergent. The mode 
of action here is monitoring by probing, sensing and responding. 
- Chaos domain: Cause and effect relationships are unclear and crises erupt 
unexpectedly, catching one completely off guard. There is no stable solution as the 
outcome is totally unpredictable. Completely new situations dominate and there is 
a need to impose patterns on chaos to make it comprehensible and manageable. 
The mode of action here is to innovate by acting, sensing and responding..  
 The Cynefin model was used as the conceptual framework for Singapore’s Risk Assessment 
and Horizon Scanning Experimentation Centre to assist in recognising and acting upon 
signals in the complex and chaotic domains.74 Bellavita was the first intelligence scholar who 
applied the Cynefin model on the intelligence discipline by using narratives to describe the 
US Home Security environment. He recommended a strategic process that incorporates the 
dynamic realities of complex adaptive systems by recognising and managing systemic 
patterns, rather than focusing on programmes. 75  
To conclude, Grant and Grant76 analysed those theories and models belonging to the more 
holistic third generation KM and identified propositions or themes of Knowledge 
Management that provide an excellent summary of what KM constitutes in the third 
generation. Although some of them originate in the first and second generations, the fact that 
they are applied in combination and not as single-focused concepts, asserts the adaptive 
principles of this school of thought. These themes can be encapsulated as follows: 
- The role of IT should not dominate, but be an enabler.  
- Early models and taxonomies of knowledge (such as the tacit/explicit dimension) 
are useful to understand the nature of knowledge in organisations, but are not the 
end-all. 
                                                 
74   Ho, Peter. 2007. Opening address at the official launch of the Singapore Risk Assessment and Horizon 
Scanning (RAHS) experimentation centre.  See also http://www.rahs.org.sg.   
75  Bellavita, Christopher. 2006. Homeland Security Affairs. 2(3)  
76  Grant, Kenneth A. and Grant, Candace T. 2008. Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology. 
5, 584-587   
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- It is more important to improve on how new knowledge is acquired, than to 
effectively use existing knowledge, especially in terms of business innovation.  
- There is greater understanding of complexity and how it impacts on organisations 
in the context of complex adaptive systems.  
- The personal, social and collective nature of knowledge enhances complexity and 
makes it difficult to institutionalise knowledge.  
- Organisations still have an intangible or market value – intellectual assets – that 
needs to be managed explicitly.     
2.6 Intelligence Analysis through the lens of the third KM 
generation  
The point of departure of this thesis is that intelligence analysts are knowledge workers in a 
knowledge organisation, as defined by some of the previous writers. The Knowledge Age 
introduced new challenges for the intelligence analyst and the discipline which changed the 
landscape irrevocably. The analysis phase of the intelligence process represents the area 
where the raw information from the collectors is analysed, synthesised and contextualised and 
then presented as intelligence. A knowledge worker’s function in the core business of an 
intelligence organisation is to create and distribute intelligence critical for decision-makers. 
Intelligence Analysis is a generic discipline found in all domains involved in the intelligence 
environment. The cognitive processes, dynamics and methodologies of knowledge creation 
are the same, whether for an analyst working on the political situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, investigating an organised crime syndicate involved in money-laundering, 
evaluating a competitor’s strengths and weaknesses, proposing global business partners, 
formulating the government’s new energy policy or evaluating the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
the education sector. The difference, however, lies in the content, scope and objectives of the 
various domains. 
This knowledge worker – the intelligence analyst – has the same task now as previously when 
the first intelligence product was written by the US’ Office of Strategic Services in June 
1942.77  At the core of knowledge creation, reasoning processes are used moving from the 
“known” to the assertion of entirely new knowledge about the previously “unknown”.78   
                                                 
77  Central Intelligence Agency. 1992. Factbook on Intelligence, 4. Although intelligence has a very long 
history dating back from Biblical times when Moses sent a reconnaissance team to Canaan and Sun Tzu 
wrote his seminal “The Art of War” in the 6th century B.C., there is no evidence that Intelligence Analysis 
as a separate job description or profession/discipline existed before the first analysts were appointed as such 
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 In this “journey” from the known to the unknown, the intelligence analyst tries to reduce 
uncertainty by collecting, analysing and synthesising information. Continuous value 
judgments are called for and made on the reliability and validity of a variety of high-volume 
sources, some of them reliable, but mostly inadequate, incomplete, ambiguous or outright 
deceptive. The timely knowledge products generated are based on hypotheses, predictions or 
estimations and customised to the strategic or operational context and needs of the client. In 
Drucker’s terms, the intelligence analyst applies knowledge to knowledge when value 
(meaning) is added to existing knowledge and then descriptive, estimative or warning 
knowledge products are generated in different formats to support the decision-maker. 
The scope of Intelligence Analysis culminates in the timely production and dissemination of 
knowledge. Even though the product provides the decision-maker with a thorough 
explanation of problems or events, and even posits and argues different options and their 
possible consequences, there is no guarantee that the recommendations will be accepted or 
implemented. The intelligence analysts rarely (if ever) have control over the actual decisions 
and actions of their clients. The consequences of those decisions or indecisions will, however, 
inform the process of continuous sensemaking and analysis.  
Drawing from Cilliers’ summary79 of the impact of complexity on our understanding of the 
world around us, it can be concluded that the intelligence community should realise that a 
threat or issue can only be understood and analysed within its own environment or context 
and not from the outside. This supports the argument from scholars and practitioners that 
analysts and other intelligence professionals should have the opportunity to gain first-hand 
exposure to, or immersion in those cultures and problems that are of intelligence value. Also, 
while analysing an issue or threat, it has to be borne in mind that the context itself changes 
continuously, which means that the issue or threat is also continuously adapting to its 
changing environment, increasing the possibility that our understanding could well be dated 
or even irrelevant. Our understanding of any system is always just a “snapshot” of it at a 
specific time and within a specific context, and not the whole truth. This forces the analyst to 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the OSS. Previously, the intelligence operative or his client evaluated and interpreted the raw 
information themselves. The modern intelligence organisation only emerged in the last century. See 
Jackson, Peter (ed) 2005. Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International 
Society for an excellent essay on the history of intelligence and Kuhns, Woodrow. 2007. Studies in 
Intelligence. 51(2) for a history of Intelligence Analysis in the CIA. 
78  Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 159 
79  Cilliers, Paul in Aaltonen, Mika. 2007. The Third Lens: multi-ontology sense-making and strategic 
decision-making, 109-110 
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be actively aware of the fluidity of a intelligence problem, focusing on variables that might 
change its essence and dynamics.  
The fact that a specific intelligence issue can be described in different ways and from different 
perspectives emphasises the necessity for bringing in multiple analysts or experts to evaluate 
it. One analyst might only view the problem from one angle at first, but by engaging in 
conversation and collaborating with others, these perspectives could grow and be enhanced to 
become more encompassing.  
The “Al Qaeda” Phenomenon80 is a typical example of what happens in the interaction 
between the analyst and the target where interpretation and description of a system, issue or 
threat lead to that system understanding itself differently and new characteristics and 
behavioural manifestations emerge as a result of the description. The analysts trying to 
understand the system are also transformed by their own understanding of it. Our 
understanding of such a system, issue or treat can never be neutral, objective, complete or 
permanent. We can only try to explain it from a certain perspective, not even knowing what 
effect our viewpoint might have on our own understanding or the system we are trying to 
explain.   
Figure 7: The continuum of Intelligence Analysis complexity (author) 
                                                 
80  Author: Al Qaeda was a relatively unknown factor in the international arena before 11 September 2001. 
However, since the US intelligence agencies’ detailed reports in the media on the terrorist network, its 
reach and strategies, as well as the resulting war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the world’s criticism against 
the US’ “War of Terror”, Al Qaeda has displayed typical CAS behaviour in that it understood itself to be 
the big threat the US purported it to be. This led to new and different characteristics and behaviours, both 
within Al Qaeda and the intelligence community in the US and the rest of the world.   
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By applying the Cynefin framework to Intelligence Analysis, new contextual insights are 
brought to the world of intelligence. The analyst functions simultaneously in a fluid world 
with different types of problems in different domains – one where the analyst and the 
intelligence organisation are not bound to only one domain, but have to cope with multiple 
domains simultaneously. It becomes clear that the analyst moves on this continuum between 
the different domains while addressing intelligence requirements on different issues (see 
figure 8), most of the time functioning in the knowable domain, analysing and thinking about 
problems.  
When problems become more exacting, the analyst will embark on scenario building, all the 
while cognisant of the fact that most of the cause and effect relationships between known 
actors are knowable. However, sometimes unexpected events like 9/11 will erupt, or a coup 
d’état will take place without forewarning, or the outbreak of a pandemic or collapse of an 
economic system will manifest. Very little of the expert knowledge could be used in such 
situations, but a collaborative effort could try to make sense of the complex interactions and 
emergent behaviours of the unknown agents.   
The remainder of the thesis continues with the application of third KM generation concepts to 
Intelligence Analysis; focusing on the changed world, how Intelligence Analysis functions in 
it, and which new perspectives could enhance the profession. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A changed world 
“We have slain a large dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety 
of poisonous snakes. And, in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.” 
James Woolsey, Former Director of the CIA on the fall of the Soviet Union 
 
“The security environment has undergone the equivalent of a shift in tectonic plate, with the 
result that only shifts of an equivalent magnitude in the way we think about this environment 
and analyse the new security threats will provide an adequate basis for good intelligence and 
sound decision-making in the first few decades of the 21st century.”  
Prof Phil Williams81 
 
The world has become increasingly complex where open systems, democratisation, and 
interactive media have not only resulted in infinite choices, but also involved more people in 
decision-making. From the most basic, individual to the intra-institutional and multinational 
levels, the milieu in which decisions have to be made has changed dramatically. The 
importance of this is illustrated by the fact that the United Nations identified the capacity to 
decide as one of the Millennium Project’s Global Challenges.82  
Although the new world poses serious challenges for individuals, systems, organisations, 
governments and multinational role-players, the situation is compounded by the fact that 
many parts of the world are still part of the “old” world. Additionally, new threats have not 
replaced old ones which mean that actors or stakeholders must factor in both traditional and 
“new” threats.  
Intelligence organisations’ missions, and specifically that of the intelligence analysts, namely 
to provide knowledge of the current situation and foreknowledge of coming events and trends, 
have thus become exponentially more difficult. In this chapter the impact of the increasing 
speed and connectivity of transactions and events, the effects of the information revolution, 
the widened scope of threats, as well as the increasing complexity of Intelligence Analysis 
will be discussed. 
                                                 
81  Williams, Phil.2004. Conference Proceedings of “New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis: Shared Threats, 
Diverse Perspectives, New Communities”, Rome, Italy, 31 March – 2 April 2004. 35 
82  United Nations. 2007. The Millennium Project: Global Challenges for Humanity. 
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3.1 Speed and connectivity  
The decision-making “window” is only open for a very short time due to the increasing speed 
with which transactions and events occur throughout the world. This has been brought about 
by the internet, multimedia and other networks. History is often only seconds old and with it, 
individual, organisational and national memories have shortened, making it difficult to sense 
the consequences of decisions and actions. Individuals and organisations are overwhelmed 
because events and patterns are enfolding so rapidly and non-linearly. This frequently results 
in confusion, anxiety and ultimately decision paralysis. 
This immediacy psyche also has an impact on intelligence. Intelligence analysts have to 
compete with media and other information brokers who communicate and disseminate 
information on world events instantaneously through the multi-media, internet and cellphone 
technology, like the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 and the Iran post-election 
demonstrations in June 2009 where text messaging (SMS), Flickr and Twitter were used to 
stream happenings to the world.83 The policy maker or decision-maker’s attention is the most 
valuable commodity to be valued and sought after. They must spend their time judiciously, 
paying attention only to those sources of information that are valuable enough to be worth 
their time and consideration.84   
Although one of the characteristics of intelligence is the timely delivery of analysis to the 
decision-maker, few intelligence organisations have adapted their processes and technology to 
provide real-time intelligence to the client. Most intelligence agencies and organisations now 
have 24/7 “Alert Centres” which scan incoming information (mostly open) and disseminate 
either the raw information or a basic analysis of it to the relevant client. However, if the client 
were to use RSS and other “as-it-happens” feeds to his cellphone, the time lag before 
receiving the official intelligence report could be quite significant. The total “intelligence –
decision – implementation” cycle time can be as short as a mere 15 minutes.85 This 
                                                 
83  In Iran, the government confined foreign journalists to their hotel rooms, forcing them to resort to Twitter 
and YouTube to send footage of demonstrations back to their headquarters. Twitter was mainly used by 
foreigners and people outside Iran to convey messages about the uprising. The Iranians themselves 
maintained contact through cellphones after the government disabled text messaging before the election. 
For more background see Arthur, Charles. 2008. How Twitter and Flickr recorded the Mumbai terror 
attacks. The Guardian. 27 November 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/nov/27/mumbai-
terror-attacks-twitter-flickr, as well as http://search.twitter.com/search?q=%23iranelection, and 
http://therealnews.com/t/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=3941 
84  Teitelbaum, Lorne. 2005. The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers’ Use of Intelligence 
Analysis.  91 
85  Andrus, D. Calvin. 2005. Studies in Intelligence, 49(3), 1. With technological advances, this has most 
probably been reduced even further. 
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strengthens the viewpoint that intelligence has become irrelevant, and is the main reason why 
clients increasingly rely on the media for current intelligence.  
3.2 The impact of the information revolution on Intelligence 
Analysis 
When, in 2000, Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman wrote that the “information revolution 
may be the single most important factor affecting intelligence today”86, they could not have 
imagined exactly what the consequences would be for Intelligence Analysis by 2009. The 
World Wide Web reached 22,89 indexed billion pages on 1 June 2009,87 and that is just one 
of the analyst’s sources of information! The sheer volume of information sources is 
overwhelming. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)88 has become the major source of 
information for the intelligence analyst. It increasingly forms the basis of an analyst’s frame 
of reference, and in addition to general research, is useful for determining a target’s priorities, 
capabilities and ideologies. Furthermore, it is less expensive and risky than human 
intelligence (HUMINT), although the latter is still the best suited to gauge the real intentions 
of a target. OSINT is immediate, while it may take years to infiltrate an agent into a terrorist 
organisation or run an effective double-agent operation.   
The information “tsunami” poses serious challenges for the intelligence analyst. Firstly, the 
main challenge is now to add value and context to information that the client has most 
probably already seen. Most policy makers have access to at least the Internet, or even better 
still, they can pick up the phone and talk to a counterpart in another organisation or country 
on issues of mutual concern.89 The value of intelligence capabilities is questioned by users 
                                                 
86  Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allan E. 2000. Best Truth: Intelligence and Security in the Information 
Age. 2 
87  See http://www.worldwidewebsize.com/ accessed 30 June 2009 
88  OSINT is that information lawfully obtained through observation, purchase or request. This includes radio, 
television and internet sources, geospatial data, photos and commercial imagery, all publicly available 
printed/published materials, experts and academics, as well as “grey” literature – that open source material 
which is not publicly available and which has distribution controls, such as databases and subscription 
journals. However, traditionalist intelligence professionals who still equate intelligence with secrets do not 
support the high profile that OSINT enjoys. Robert Steele, advocate of the OSINT movement in the US has 
been critical of the continued lack of comprehension among US senior intelligence officials about the value 
of OSINT. (see Steele, Robert D. 2002(b). Time. 11 January 2002.) In what might be seen as a step in the 
right direction, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established an Open Source Centre in July 2006 
to coordinate OSINT activities in the US intelligence community. (see Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. 2006. Intelligence Community Directive Number 301) 
89  See Teitelbaum, Lorne. 2005. The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers’ Use of 
Intelligence Analysis, 205. In the study, Teitelbaum found that policy makers primarily rely on CNN for 
ongoing information, while intelligence briefings assist in contextualising the news. It is interesting to note 
that they preferred using the telephone to the Internet. In another study in 2000, when senior policy makers 
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when so much other information is available while traditional intelligence sources are slow, 
inconclusive or hidebound by classification rules and other controls.90 Competition with 
commercial information suppliers, who provide raw data as well as sophisticated analysis, 
will most probably intensify in the future as the economic value of knowledge increases. With 
all these information-rich sources, decision-makers actually create their own knowledge as 
they filter and merge intelligence from multiple sources and place it in their own context.  
Secondly, the intelligence analysts struggle to carve out a niche in this field of overabundance 
of information. They have to find a balance between reporting on current events and long-
term strategic intelligence. Too often, their time is wholly focused on monitoring current 
intelligence, and not on medium- to long-term warning. The result is an analytical cadre 
whose main activity is to be “special” journalists, collating current intelligence on a specific 
topic from various sources, often merely regurgitating what others have already voiced 
without contextualisation. Their strategic analytical abilities have become superficial and 
mostly consist of stating the obvious short-term forecasting. Heuer suggests that more should 
be expected from analysts than that which is produced by journalists, academics and think-
tanks. He proposes that analysts should rather question assumptions and develop analytical 
frameworks to guide the interpretation of current intelligence.91    
Thirdly, the task of evaluating the veracity, reliability and timeliness of information gleaned 
from open sources has become extremely difficult. Analysts have to be aware of the 
possibility of deception and misinformation, now to a greater extent and occurrence than with 
covert intelligence. A recent example is the allegations that many of the tweets in the Iran 
post-election demonstrations were either the product of Israeli and US attempts to build public 
sympathy for the Iranian opposition, or attempts by Iranian intelligence operatives who used 
Twitter to entrap locals.92 This again highlights the importance of analysts’ capabilities to be 
able to discern between reality, perception and possible denial and deception efforts by 
unknown actors.    
                                                                                                                                                        
were asked to identify the unclassified information sources they relied on, 85% of the respondents chose all 
four of the following sources: foreign newspapers and weekly periodicals; US newspapers and weekly 
periodicals; their professional networks, and official, informal communications, such as e-mail – see 
Medina, Carmen A. 2002. Studies in Intelligence 46(3), 23-28  
90  Barger, Deborah G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, 18 
91  Heuer, Richards J. 2004. Orbis.Winter , 94 
92  http://www.patronusanalytical.com/files/Twitter%20and%20disinformation%20in%20Iran.php  
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Fourthly, the analysts are aware that they do not have all the relevant information and have to 
make quick judgement calls on information that most probably is incomplete.93 Not only are 
they looking for the proverbial “needle in a haystack” but most of OSINT has already been 
drafted or communicated within the framework of an English (or Western) paradigm. Chinese 
is quickly overtaking English on the Internet94 and intelligence organisations do not have the 
capacity to understand and translate critical information quickly. Most of the threats and 
opportunities of the new world are found in countries and regions outside the English rim. 
The Middle East, Korea, India and China all pose a linguistic and cultural nightmare for 
intelligence organisations.  
Furthermore, the access to information has broadened the client base to such an extent that 
when intelligence analysts prioritise and produce, they have to be cognisant of every possible 
decision-maker that might need to know the information or with whom they should share it. 
Depending on the nature, mandate or scope of the intelligence organisation, these clients 
might be law enforcement or other intelligence agencies, the private security sector or 
businesses on local, provincial/regional and national levels. In addition, governments’ 
involvement in transnational institutions like the UN, EU, AU or SADC makes the “market” 
for intelligence products even vaster. Each individual potential client has his/her own 
information needs, intelligence priorities and contexts which compound the analysts’ tasks to 
deliver effective intelligence timely even further. 
Lastly, the interconnectedness of the new world has an unintended consequence for 
intelligence organisations. Should an intelligence report be leaked to or lawfully shared with 
the press, it may shape phenomena that are being analysed or used in public debate for 
political purposes. Berkowitz and Goodman provided the example of an official US 
government intelligence estimate that concluded that the value of the Indonesian rupiah was 
shaky. The consequence, one can almost guarantee, might be that if it was not, it would soon 
be.95 As was the case with the US’ National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear 
weapons capabilities in December 2007, intelligence disclosure can also impact on national, 
bilateral and multi-lateral relationships and steer events in a totally different direction.96 On a 
                                                 
93  Many intelligence organisations only focus on the Internet as OSINT resource.  
94  Mercado, Stephen C. 2004. Studies in Intelligence. 48(3) 
95  Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allan E. 2000. Best Truth: Intelligence and Security in the Information 
Age, 100 
96  The DNI’s NIE stated that Iran ceased its nuclear weapon programme in 2003, countering Pres. Bush’s 
threats of a possible invasion of Iran to stop the nuclear weapons programme. Those political role-players 
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more positive note, Interpol used the interconnectivity of the Internet and media in October 
2007 and succeeded in identifying an alleged paedophile by posting his photograph on 
Internet news pages, youtube.com and Interpol’s website. Law Enforcement agencies 
worldwide have used social media since 2007 to identify and apprehend suspects.97    
3.3 The widened scope  
During the Cold War, intelligence organisations knew exactly who their enemy was. 
Likewise, before globalisation, the environment of commercial enterprises was bound and 
certain. The new connected world poses extreme challenges to all role-players that practise 
intelligence. Not only do they have to cope with the “traditional” threats, but also with new 
and emerging threats as well as opportunities. 
 In Figure 8, Wolfberg’s98 timeline depicts how the focus of the US intelligence community 
has changed during the past few decades from being policy-centric (a political focus) to a 
multi-dimensional focus where threats pertaining to the economic sphere, law enforcement 
and terrorism vie for budgets and priority together with policy and military threats. In other 
countries, these focuses will be contextual, depending on what constitutes national security at 
certain stages. For the intelligence communities in South Africa, policy, military and 
counterterrorism threats have been replaced or joined by new threats in the human and food-
security fields in the post-1994 era. In June 2009, the South African Minister for State 
Security listed these new threats as “poverty, underdevelopment; environmental degradation, 
food insecurity and increased competition for scarce natural resources; pandemics and 
disease; and human and natural disasters. They include intra and inter-state conflict; terrorism; 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation; espionage; subversion; sabotage; 
transnational syndicated crime and corruption; smuggling and human trafficking; critical 
infrastructure (sic) and systems failure.”99 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the US, as well as countries that opposed Bush’s stance towards Iran, welcomed the NIE, while Israel, its 
supporters in the US and Bush supporters, attacked the DNI for “forsaking analysis and venturing into the 
policy domain.”  
97  See http://www.interpol.int/Public/THB/vico/Default.asp for the Interpol case and the New Zealand 
Police’s use of Facebook http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/01/14/nz.facebook.arrest/index.html. 
98  Wolfberg, Adrian. 2006. Military Review, 38 
99  Cwele, Siyabonga. 2009. Why South African needs its spies  
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Traditional security focuses on state actors that have histories, constraining laws, boundaries, 
cultures and definite structures. On the other hand, non-traditional threats are much more 
diverse, fluid, networked, hidden, mutable, mostly related to ideas and ideologies and not 
bound to laws, borders or structures like traditional threats. They can act quickly and in 
unexpected ways and the effects of their actions (or inaction) permeate society on all levels 
and across all domains.100  
Figure 7: A convergence of focus for the US intelligence community101 
 
The following threats constitute an intelligence organisation’s “blind spots”:  
- The increasing number of non-state actors and stakeholders in the global political, 
economic, social, military and technological playing fields. Most worrisome is the 
growing number of non-governmental organisations, quasi-government 
organisations, multi-national corporations, transnational social movements and 
civil society organisations which function and network without any control.102  
                                                 
100  Fishbein, Warren and Treverton, Gregory F. 2004. Sherman Kent School of Analysis Occasional papers. 
3(1), 8-10 
101  Wolfberg, Adrian. 2006. Military Review. July-August 2006, 38 
102  There are no reliable statistics on the number of different non-governmental organisations available. Most 
countries do not control or monitor such organisations, while most of them are also not members of 
international “oversight” bodies. In 2004 the United Nations estimated that there were a total of 61,000 
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These non-state actors not only include “structured” phenomena like criminal 
organisations, terrorist networks, proliferation networks, but also diseases, 
commodities, ideologies, religions and ideas. 
- Failed and failing states – as many as 60 states with a population of 20 billion 
people are in danger of collapsing.103  
- In addition to states, disorderly spaces exist which are areas where governance is 
weak or where alternatives to state governance are in place. These include zones of 
social and economic exclusion (as well as mega- and feral cities) that are important 
incubators of crime, terrorism and disease.104 
- Continued and heightened ethnocentric, sectarian and religious conflict often 
spanning across whole regions, and crossing nation-state boundaries. 
- Socio-economic threats like health risks, the spread of diseases, and high cost of 
medical aid and food security. 
- The geo-political implications of climate change.  
- Global flows of illicit commodities and capital. 
- Aging infrastructure, and depleting energy sources. 
- Technological advances in all fields that might have a destabilising effect in 
various sectors.  
- Emerging competitors, new processes, scarce natural resources, market shifts and 
global recessive trends in the business intelligence field.  
3.4 Complexity principles applied to intelligence 
In the traditional intelligence paradigm, Intelligence Analysis is quite straightforward. The 
analysts look at their topics or issues and apply linear, cause-and-effect and inward-looking 
                                                                                                                                                        
transnational corporations with as many as 900,000 foreign affiliates around the world. These statistics 
only reflect business entities, and not those active in the social, political or environmental sphere. See 
Russel, James A. 2006. Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), 647-648 
103  Failed or failing states are characterised by a government that has or is losing physical control of its 
territory or lacks the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of authority to make collective 
decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the loss of the capacity to interact in 
formal relations with other states as a full member of the international community – see Russel, James A. 
2006. Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), 651-653 
104  Williams, Phil. 2006. Emerging Threats in the 21st Century: Strategic Foresight and Warning Seminar 
Series, 10 
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reductionist analysis. They break the problems into constituent pieces, solve each separately, 
and then value the results from the pieces to obtain the overall solution to the problem. The 
body of information is a closed system, and products are written with a significant degree of 
outcome certainties.105   
As discussed in Chapter 2, complexity106 provides a framework for understanding the 
nonlinear dynamics of the world and is interrelated with the speed of change, connectedness 
and the broadening of the intelligence threat. The value of complexity as a framework is 
increasingly realised and applied in organisations, society and the military.107 It should be 
even more vigorously applied in the intelligence arena but, unfortunately, that is not the case. 
Intelligence organisations, already not open to discourse on theoretical developments in other 
fields of study as they label themselves as ‘unique’, do not understand the concept of 
complexity and seem to be grappling with the new threat environment by applying outdated 
frames. 
The intelligence literature also reflects the scant attention given to the application of the 
complexity in intelligence as only three scholars refer to it briefly:  
- Cooper108 makes a cursory attempt to describe the US Intelligence community as a 
complex adaptive system (CAS), without expanding on what the 
properties/characteristics of CAS are, and how they impact on the practice and 
organisations of intelligence;  
- Andrus109 discusses the history of the systems theory and the characteristics of 
CAS to argue the benefits of the Wiki and Blog as self-organising, networked tools 
for the evolution of the intelligence community to become a CAS.  
- The best linkage between the complexity theory and the implications thereof for 
intelligence is derived from Williams110 who focused on how analysts should 
                                                 
105  Rinaldi, Steven.1997. Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. Symposium proceedings, 114 
106  Complexity arises from the inter-relationship, inter-action and inter-connectivity of elements within a 
system and between a system and its environment - See Mitleton-Kelly, Eve. 2003. Complex systems and 
evolutionary perspectives of organisations: the application of complexity theory to organisations, 4 
107  In the US military, the body of knowledge on complexity science and its application on doctrines like 
“netcentric warfare” is an excellent basis for similar studies in the intelligence field. See the work of Steven 
Rinaldi, Edward Smith, and Alberts and Czerwinski. 
108  Cooper, Jeffrey R. 2005. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis, 9 
109  Andrus, D. Calvin. 2005. Studies in Intelligence, 49(3), 63-70 
110  Williams, Phil. 2004. Conference Proceedings of “New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis: Shared Threats, 
Diverse Perspectives, New Communities”, Rome, Italy, 31 March – 2 April 2004. 35-61 
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understand it so that they can analyse the networks, the tipping points and the 
context of the new world. If intelligence analysts understand and distinguish 
between the associated patterns of complexity, they will be able to provide 
considerable insight into possible developments and manifestations of threats.   
It is imperative for intelligence organisations to be familiar with aspects of the complexity 
science so that they are able to understand their targets and can try to influence interrelated 
issues and emerging situations.111 A case in point is the threat of terrorism. Terrorist networks 
have evolved from locally-oriented political organisations into complex, adaptive, loosely 
structured groups that span international borders to promote larger regional and global goals 
through violent asymmetric attacks dependent on compartmentalisation and deception. The 
intelligence community should likewise evolve into a network, capable of collecting and 
sharing credible, reliable and corroborative information on an unprecedented scale, 
transcending geographic, agency and political boundaries.112  
The aim of this thesis is not aimed at a detailed discussion of the application of complexity on 
intelligence; however, it refers to a few eclectic issues that impact on the way intelligence 
analysts view the changed world. Further study of the dynamic interplay between complexity 
and intelligence would be necessary if intelligence is serious about understanding the new 
threat. 
3.4.1 Unpredictability and uncertainty 
Characteristics of complexity include the fact that two or more entities interacting together 
create complex interrelationships, whose details cannot be predicted. They are capable of 
adaptation and evolution and can create new order and coherence.113 Linking complexity to 
military intelligence (and therefore applicable to other domains of intelligence as well) Smith 
describes the world as “fraught with uncertainties and ambiguities and beset by both 
unknowns and unknowables.” The reason is that the entities in this system adapt to changes in 
the environment, but also co-evolve with other complementary as well as competing systems, 
and in that process change the environment. The result is a world in perpetual flux, its rate 
changing unpredictably and often for reasons that cannot immediately be comprehended or 
                                                 
111  In 2007, Irene Sanders, founder of the Washington Centre for Complexity and Public Policy and author of 
Strategic Thinking in a Complex World, started to present workshops on Strategic Intelligence Analysis in a 
Complex World to analysts in the US civilian intelligence community.  
112  Tindall, James A. 2006. Applying Network Theory to Develop A Dedicated National Intelligence Network, 
v 
113  Mitleton-Kelly, Eve. 2003. Complex systems and evolutionary perspectives of organisations: the 
application of complexity theory to organisations, 4 
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that appear to defy logic and rationality as we – the products of our own complex culture and 
society – might view them. It is also a world in which competition between and among actors 
is the norm even though the formats this competition acquires are many, varied, and 
continually changing. 114  
What is the effect of the complexity principle of unpredictability on Intelligence Analysis? 
The intelligence analysts’ main task is to forewarn and lessen the uncertainty for the decision-
maker. But, it is impossible to predict accurately in an environment or system that is 
characterised by unknown variables, interdependent actors, outside influences, time lags and 
unintended consequences. The complexity theory makes it clear that there is no single perfect 
answer to complex challenges and we must accept “the degree of precision that the nature of 
the subject admits, and not seek exactness when only approximation is possible.”115   
Williams116 states that “surprise is both endemic and inevitable. Perhaps the most that can be 
done, therefore, is to reduce the frequency of surprise and its strategic significance.” He 
presents four major sources of surprise in the complexity theory which should be kept in mind 
by the intelligence analyst to reduce uncertainty, in this case applied to nuclear proliferation: 
- Paradoxical outcomes: The very act of restricting things that are in demand, such 
as nuclear weapons, increases their value and encourages new suppliers to enter 
the market. From both market and complexity perspectives the nuclear non-
proliferation regime contains the seeds for its own destruction. 
- Discontinuity and tipping points: In complexity, the outcome or downstream 
effects of small events are unpredictable. Events could have catastrophic 
consequences, in effect being the tipping point for unrelated and disproportionate 
outcomes.  
- Irreducibility of systems: It is impossible to reduce systems because they represent 
more than their constituent parts. In intelligence and law enforcement, action 
against one subsystem rarely has any effect on the whole system, because the latter 
can adapt much faster than, in this case, intelligence agencies are able to.  
- Emergent behaviour and morphing networks: Because the system has the capacity 
to learn and adapt, it can change whenever the circumstances require. For the 
                                                 
114  Smith, Edward A. 2006. DoD Command and Control Research Program Publication Series, 2-3 
115  Smith, Edward A. 2006. DoD Command and Control Research Program Publication Series, 68-69 
116  Williams, Phil. 2006. Strategic Insights, 5(6) 
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intelligence analyst, this would mean that the characteristics and capabilities of a 
threat or target are morphing continuously, which requires a possibility-driven 
mind.  
The difficulty in creating usable intelligence leads to analytical and conceptual tensions117 
between the need to provide bottom-line assessments that are usable in the real world, as 
opposed to analysis that is more nuanced, less straightforward, and thus less readily usable as 
a basis for practical action. In addition, intelligence clients are notorious for equating 
intelligence with facts and pressurising intelligence for “factual” or “evidential” intelligence – 
which is actually history and not forewarning!  
 To convey the uncertainty, Intelligence Analysis has over the years developed estimative 
language to describe the grade or level of certainty.118 Words like “possible”, “probably”, 
“likely”, “could” and “perhaps” are used in analyses, unfortunately many times 
indiscriminately and not specific to what exactly is uncertain. The consumer would then cast 
the analysis aside, deriding that intelligence does not convey anything. In the US specifically, 
where intelligence is increasingly exposed, and even manipulated in the political and public 
arena, it has become imperative for the client to be absolutely sure what is meant by these, 
and other similar words. Therefore, the intelligence community started with an education 
“campaign” where the estimative language used is explained to the client, and when shared 
with the media, the public at large is also educated on what the purpose and limits of 
intelligence are (see Figure 9). This campaign can potentially lead to a standardisation in the 
use of intelligence terminologies that might help the intelligence analyst to gauge the existing 
level of uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Figure 9: Continuum of Estimates of Likelihood 
                                                 
117  Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS). 2007. Annual International 
Conference Report. 4 
118  In addition to information sources that are evaluated and graded according to reliability, the validity or 
accuracy of information is also graded when dealing with the raw information. Furthermore, finished 
intelligence reports would use the words probably, likely, most likely, etc to convey grades of certainty. 
Since the early days of Intelligence Analysis, there have been debates over what these probabilistic terms 
really meant. Attempts were made to put quantifiable percentages to the different terms using Bayesian 
tools. (see Kent, Sherman. 1962. Studies in Intelligence). It is doubtful whether these terms could be 
standardised, as languages, vocabularies and expressions differ not only between countries, but also 
between intelligence organisations in the same country.  
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The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) explains the use of estimative language as follows: 
“In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often 
conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence 
we ascribe to the judgment.” The confidence of judgements can be categorised as:  
- High confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality 
information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid 
judgment. A “high confidence” judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and 
such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong. 
- Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and 
plausible, but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a 
higher level of confidence. 
- Low confidence generally means that the credibility and/or plausibility of the 
information is questionable, or that it is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to 
make solid analytic inferences, or that there are significant concerns or problems 
with the sources. 119 
 An even greater challenge to Intelligence Analysis is represented by those things “we don’t 
know that we don’t know” – the “unknown-unknowns” which are accommodated by the 
complex and chaotic domains of the Cynefin framework. When the nature of future threats is 
undetermined, intelligence analysts will not now know the questions they may be required to 
answer in the future.120 Schmitt states the best that can be hoped for is to work out 
probabilities – or, as Hayek suggests, focus on the "prediction of the principle"– and even 
then the system will surprise. Dealing with complexity is not difficult provided that there is a r 
realistic acceptance of what can be known and what cannot, and then build on what can be 
known to create a pragmatic understanding sufficient to deal with the challenge.121 
3.4.2 Connectivity, interdependence and co-evolution   
Mitleton-Kelly describes the complexity properties of connectivity and interdependence as 
those pertaining to a decision or action by any individual, group, organisation, institution or 
human system that will affect all other related individuals and systems. The effect will, 
                                                 
119  Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2007. National Intelligence Estimate, 5 
120  Dahl, Erik. 2004. Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against terrorism, 80 
121  Schmitt, John F. 1997. Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security Symposium proceedings, 107-
109 
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however, not be of equal or uniform impact, and vary according to the ‘state’ of each related 
individual and system at the time. The ‘state’ of an individual and system will include its 
history and constitution, which in turn will include its organisation and structure. Connectivity 
applies to the interrelatedness of individuals within a system, as well as the relatedness 
between human social systems, which again include systems or artefacts such as information 
technology (IT) and intellectual systems of ideas. Co-evolution means that the evolution of 
one domain or entity is partially dependent on the evolution of other related domains or 
entities; or that one domain or entity changes in the context of the other(s).122 
The application of the complexity framework stands in direct opposition to the traditional, 
linear, reductionist method of analysing intelligence. In this new paradigm, analysts cannot 
claim that they are experts in their fields or topics when their analysis is one-dimensional, i.e. 
only focusing on the party-political dynamics in country X, while ignoring the linkages to and 
connections with the socio-economic, diplomatic, military, criminal, multilateral, business 
and financial as well as societal landscapes. They have to know what the effects of these 
linkages are, and how the development or transformation of different subsystems (or 
“landscapes” in this case) impact on one another. 
It is imperative for analysts to be "big picture" thinkers who can instantly synthesise 
information from a variety of sources; spot subtle connections, emerging patterns, and 
discontinuities, and ask questions even before the "dots" are fully formed.123 It is also 
impossible to expect of analysts to have a sound knowledge of all issues involved in the 
previously discussed threats. Therefore, analysis should be carried out in a networked manner, 
incorporating experts from different fields. Not only will it enhance sensemaking, but the 
typical cognitive dangers of mental biases and groupthink might be reduced.  This will be 
further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The new world with its speed of connectivity, widened scope and complexity poses pressing 
challenges for intelligence organisations, and specifically their intelligence analysts. It has 
changed the relationship with clients, interaction with threats and opened up collaborative 
avenues with analysts from other organisations and disciplines. It empowers the individual, 
whether it is the decision-maker, analyst or Joe Public, to access information, form an opinion 
                                                 
122  Mitleton-Kelly, Eve. 2003. Complex systems and evolutionary perspectives of organisations: the 
application of complexity theory to organisations, 4-5 
123  Sanders, T. Irene. 2004. Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2004 
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about issues (previously only the domain of the government) and disseminate them worldwide 
in milliseconds. Too few intelligence organisations, in any domain, have adapted their 
structures, culture and capabilities to better understand this new world and deal with both 
traditional and transnational threats (see figure 10). “Radical changes have to be made in the 
way we do intelligence.”124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Summary of traditional vs. transnational targets125 
 
  
                                                 
124  Central Intelligence Agency. 2004. Center for Intelligence Studies Conference Report, 15 
125  Fishbein, Warren and Treverton, Gregory. 2004. Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, 
Occasional Papers, 3(1),11 
 Traditional Targets Transnational Targets 
Focus  States, non-states secondary Non-states, states as facilitators, willingly or not 
Nature of Target Hierarchical  Networked 
Context 
Intelligence and policy share 
basic “story” about states 
Much less shared story about 
non-states, less bounded, more 
outcomes possible 
Information 
Too little information, pride 
of place to secrets, secrets 
regarded as reliable 
Secrets matter, but torrents 
fragmented, unreliable 
Pace and 
trajectory of 
events 
Primary target slow moving, 
discontinuities rare 
Target may move quickly, 
discontinuities all too possible 
Interaction 
effects 
Limited “Your” actions and observations 
have more effect on target’s 
behaviour 
Need for 
collaboration 
Limited, analysis in 
“stovepipes” 
Greater with both regional and 
functional intelligence 
specialists, plus different levels 
of government 
Policy support 
Consumers mostly politico-
military officials of federal 
government 
Wide range of consumers, 
intelligence often linked to 
action on a continuing basis 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Analysing intelligence  
 
Here is Edward Bear, coming downstairs now, bump, bump, bump, on the back of his head, 
behind Christopher Robin. It is, as far as he knows, the only way of coming downstairs, but 
sometimes he thinks that there really is another way, if only he could stop bumping for a 
minute and think of it.  
A. A. Milne, The Complete Tales of Winnie the Pooh 126 
 
  
Although the world has changed dramatically, the centrality of the intelligence analyst in the 
intelligence/knowledge business remains undisputed.127 The words of the father of 
Intelligence Analysis, Sherman Kent (1967) remain true, whether analysts find themselves in 
the knowable or complex domains: “Whatever the complexities of the puzzles we strive to 
solve and whatever the sophisticated techniques we may use to collect the pieces and store 
them, there can never be a time when the thoughtful man can be supplanted as the intelligence 
device supreme.”128  
The main problem with Intelligence Analysis in the Knowledge Age is that we continue to 
rely on the “analytic tools, methodologies, and processes that were appropriate to the static 
and hierarchical nature of the Soviet threat during the Cold War and were, in that 
environment, largely successful.”129 Richards Heuer, the scholar who started the study and 
debate on Intelligence Analysis’ cognitive processes and challenges with his book Psychology 
of Intelligence Analysis (published in 1999), in 2004 again stated that “the intelligence 
community needs to develop a twenty-first century analytical culture that differs from the 
conventional intuitive analysis of the past.”130  
This thesis does not aim to investigate the extensive research done in thinking and analytical 
processes by the cognitive psychology discipline, but merely attempts to reflect the 
                                                 
126  Milne, AA. 1996. The Complete Tales of Winnie-the-Pooh, 1 
127  The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA). 2005. Defense Intelligence 
Journal 14(1), 41  
128  Heuer, Richards J. 1999. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, xiii 
129  Cooper, Jeffrey R. 2005. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. 23 
130  Heuer, Richards J. 2004. Orbis, 94 
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intelligence analysis discipline’s literature on this topic. This chapter addresses the functions 
and activities of the intelligence analyst as a knowledge worker who “thinks for a living”. 
4.1 Thinking pitfalls 
Lefebre stated that “the kernel of the problem with respect to Intelligence Analysis seems to 
reside in the analyst’s mind – in his thought processes – and with his hierarchy.” 131 
Mindsets, biases and other subjective, human cognitive errors may be more visible in the 
Intelligence Analysis process than in other similar knowledge worker activities. The reason 
for that is that what goes on in the mind has a direct impact on the analyst’s identification and 
perception of the intelligence problem, the evaluation of the veracity and validity of the 
information and the methods and tools the analyst chooses to explain, estimate or predict.  
The human being’s mental capacity is limited and cannot deal with the complexities of the 
world around us. We construct a simplified mental model of reality and then work with this 
model, behaving rationally within the confines of our mental model – according to Herbert 
Simon’s theory of bounded or limited rationality. The problem with our mental models is that 
they are not always well adapted to suit the requirements of the real world.132  
An analyst’s mindset puts a situation or event into context – within a frame of reference. 
However, our mindset also causes us to apply unsuitable frames of references which limit our 
proper understanding of a situation. It is prudent for intelligence analysts to be mindful of 
their own psychological make-up to better understand the actors being analysed and to 
comprehend the potential pitfalls that can affect their sensemaking of data. Many scholars 
have written about cognitive pitfalls, biases and the like in psychology and other social 
sciences. This thesis does not attempt to discuss those issues that factor in on our problem-
solving capacities, but will cursorily refer to some that impact on Intelligence Analysis. 
Several scholars in the field of Intelligence Analysis have highlighted some of these issues 
within the discipline which are especially challenging. Richards Heuer, in his book 
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis paved the way for more scholars like Krizan, Thompson, 
Morgan and Davis to investigate the types of cognitive problems intelligence analysts face 
and made recommendations on how they can be avoided or minimised through more 
structured and reduced intuitive analysis.  
                                                 
131  Lefebre, Stéphane. 2004. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(2), 240 
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In addition to one’s mindset, which is already quite difficult to change, Thompson133 defines 
three types of biases which influence the validity and objectivity of the analyst’s judgement 
on issues and events. These are: 
4.1.1 Cultural biases  
These biases are constraints on one’s thinking, acquired during maturation from widely held 
beliefs, practices or cognitive styles that characterise one's specific social environment while 
personal biases are constraints that arise from specific past experiences of the individual. 
4.1.2 Organisational biases  
These constraints on cognitive flexibility are imposed by local information, goals, mores, and 
traditions, which have evolved within the specific organisation in which the individual serves.  
Cognitive rigidity, or elsewhere called “organisational lock-in”, has a devastating impact on 
the intelligence organisation and Intelligence Analysis in particular. Robson’s words “it 
calcifies beliefs and assumptions and if left unchallenged, can create a collective myopia that 
endangers organizational effectiveness and ultimate survival”134 ring true, not only for many 
intelligence organisations, but also for those outside the knowledge creation business. 
4.1.3 Cognitive biases  
In contrast to the previous two, cognitive biases are to a large extent inherent characteristics 
of the way humans think, both in the way they recall information from memory and in the 
way they process (perceive and understand) information from their environment. Cognitive 
biases are mental errors caused by the simplified information processing strategies used and 
are consistent and predictable. In general, cognitive biases tend to distort what is remembered, 
how it is remembered, as well as how information is evaluated. The trouble with biases, 
however, is that they impose artificial constraints and boundaries on what we think and we are 
not even aware that our thinking is restricted.  
Intelligence analysts, in fact all knowledge workers and even those who do not “think for a 
living” are susceptible to cognitive biases, some of which are: 
- Selectivity bias: Only information that is vivid, concrete and personal is recalled, 
the rest is ignored or not even noticed. In another sense, a source might report on 
an isolated event, or on the observations of one person, which leads one to lend 
                                                 
133  Thompson J. R, Hopf-Weichel R., and Geiselman R. E. 1984. The Cognitive bases for Intelligence 
Analysis, 2.9-2.12 
134  Robson, David W. 2005. Mitre International Conference on Intelligence Analysis, 6 
51 
 
more weight to the personal anecdotes and histories. This results in incomplete and 
distorted perceptions of the reality.135 
- Confirmation bias is the tendency to perceive events in a way that confirms 
existing beliefs.136 Analysts can either perceive events that fit within their existing 
conceptual model, or distort the meaning of what is seen to accord with their 
preconceived ideas.  In effect, they perceive what they expect to perceive. In 
scenario building, information will then be interpreted in a way to confirm 
hypotheses that already exist, or ignore new information that does not support 
existing hypotheses. 
- Reliability bias: Frequently analysts will deal with information without testing and 
validating the specific information. If a source usually provides reliable 
information, it is difficult to identify deception or misrepresentation of facts. First 
impressions do last, despite their being unreliable and having an emotional basis.  
- Anchoring bias is the intuitive and unconscious tendency to simplify the task of 
mentally processing complex information. A starting point is often used when 
confronted with a new threat, a new working environment and the like. One 
would, for instance, take a predecessor’s documents and use them as a starting 
point for understanding information, due to time and information constraints. This 
in itself is not bad, but it reduces the possibility of a “fresh-eyes” approach and 
fosters groupthink. 
Krizan137 identifies a few additional biases that impact on Intelligence Analysis: 
- Superficial lessons from history are made when uncritical analyses are formulated 
of concepts or events by over-generalising causality or inappropriate extrapolation 
from past successes or failures. 
- Secrecy paranoia or “fetishing”138 secret intelligence bias is a problem in the need-
to-know intelligence community. Some analysts, managers or clients might only 
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believe secret information, and will not accept the possibility that open sources can 
deliver the same quality or even better intelligence. In other instances, one might 
believe that if there is no secret information on a subject or threat, it has ceased 
with activities or that it no longer exists. 
- Ethnocentrism and mirror-imaging refers to a bias that allows for the projection of 
an own culture, ideological beliefs, doctrine or expectation on others that do not 
share the same orientations. A closed system, groupthink and wishful thinking lead 
to mirror-imaging. 
- A related bias, that of lack of empathy, manifests when people cannot fathom that 
others have their own realities and perceptions of the world that differ radically. 
This bias leads to an insensitivity of other contexts, rules and cultures.  
- Rational actor bias refers to the assumption that others will act in a rational 
manner, based on one’s own (rational) referential framework. The first reaction to 
the 9/11 attacks or suicide bombers is that of disbelief, a “how-can-someone-do-
that?” mindset because it is alien to the Western outlook on life.139 The other 
possibility is denial of rationality where everyone that acts outside the limits of 
one’s own standards is considered irrational.  
- Proportionality bias is that expectation that the adversary will expend efforts 
proportionate to the ends he seeks. The analyst will make unsound inferences on 
the intentions of others and their measurement of what proportionality they may 
attach to realising and furthering their interests. 
- Wishful thinking (Pollyanna Complex) is the bias that refers to analysts who are 
extremely naïve and whose excessive optimism is born out of smugness and 
overconfidence. 
- Risk avoidance or conservatism represents the desire to avoid risk or estimate 
either extremely high or low probabilities. Usually this bias is accompanied by 
routine thinking as well as selectivity and confirmation biases.  
- Worst-Case Analysis (Cassandra Complex) displays a bias where the analyst is 
excessively sceptic and pessimistic about events and intentions of people and other 
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actors. The analyst will consequently exhibit extreme caution, based on a mental 
frame of reference formed by past experiences. 
Reminding analysts and their managers of these pitfalls might make them more conscious of 
and cautious in the production and with the evaluation of intelligence. Most biases and 
mindsets are resistant to change and can only be altered by repeated exposure to new 
information and alternative viewpoints.  
4.2 Analytical and thinking approaches, methods and techniques 
Although analysts might have profound specialist knowledge of a topic which is challenged 
and changes on a daily basis by incoming information from various sources, they at times, and 
under severe time constraints and other organisational hurdles, must make sense of this 
information – in nature often fragmentary, ambiguous, contradictory and subject to deception. 
Moreover, the information might be about matters that have already occurred; however, they 
must also look into the uncertain future. Analysts can perform four functions: describe, 
explain, evaluate, or forecast. For whatever type of analysis is undertaken, the analyst must 
possess an extensive toolkit of different analytical approaches in order to work effectively 
with the divergent kinds of data. At a minimum, a good analyst must be skilled in the use of 
logic, statistical inference, analysing cause and effect, probability and decision-making 
models.140    
A main organisational hurdle is the fact that intelligence clients still believe analysts should 
provide them with facts and evidence while the complexities of the Knowledge Age, at best, 
provide only weak signals, clues and indicators. A case in point is that of the former US 
Secretary of Defence and later Chairperson of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz141, who, in 
1995, stated that the analysis process is not a mystery, and that analytical products should lay 
out the facts, the evidence and analysis. In contrast, recent authors, like Berkowitz and 
Goodman142 noted that in many instances the truth is simply unknowable and the future 
depends on the “unknown unknowns” and mysteries. 
The analyst’s dilemma to marry objectivity with the “truth”, to best guess or rely on gut 
feeling while working against the clock, evaluating the reliability of the source of information 
as well as the validity of the information itself, continue to haunt both analyst and client alike. 
                                                 
140  Garst, Ronald and Gross, Max. 1997. Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2), 53 
141  Wolfowitz, Paul. 1995. in Godson, Roy (ed). US Intelligence at the Cross-roads: Agendas for reform, 77 
142  Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allan E. 2000. Best Truth: Intelligence and Security in the Information 
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Analysts just do not have the luxury of time to think about their thinking, or consider what 
other analytical tool might achieve better results. They often need to be brought to a standstill 
by an intelligence failure or similar radical event to review their subconscious craft and what 
can be done to improve it. Such an event proved to be the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers 
and the Pentagon. The 9/11 Commission advised that the “lack of imagination” of the 
analytical community should be addressed. That comment provided the impetus for renewed 
research into how analysts think and what can be done to improve their thought processes.   
Unfortunately the limited literature on analytical and thinking tools and techniques in 
intelligence makes it difficult to compare approaches to this topic. At the time of completing 
this thesis, Heuer and Pherson143 were in the process of publishing a book in which they 
propose a taxonomy of analytical methods based on the four approaches followed in 
Intelligence Analysis. These approaches are distinguished by the nature of the analytic 
methods used, the type of quantification if any, and the type of data that is available. The 
approaches might flow into one another, creating a continuum that ranges from art to science. 
The book then describes the different methods and in which contexts they should be used. 
Heuer and Pherson’s practical book might go a long way in developing the analysis skills of 
intelligence professionals. 
In this thesis, more emphasis will be placed on the qualitative analysis methods as quantitative 
methods are hardly ever applied in modern intelligence and the literature is negligible at this 
stage. The four approaches proposed by Heuer and Pherson are: 
- Unaided analytic judgment which includes the traditional intuitive way most 
Intelligence Analysis is done. It also includes evidentiary reasoning, i.e. critical 
thinking, historical method, case study method, and reasoning by analogy. 
 
This 
method is usually presented by an individual effort in which the reasoning remains 
largely in the mind of the individual analyst until it is written down in a draft 
report.  
- Structured analysis that uses structured, non-quantitative techniques that mitigate 
the adverse impact of known cognitive limitations and pitfalls. These structured 
techniques externalise the analyst’s thinking in a transparent manner which can 
                                                 
143  I am indebted to Dick Heuer and Randy Pherson for sharing with me the draft publication of their book to 
be published in February 2010 and giving me permission to use it in the thesis. Heuer, Richards J. and 
Pherson, Randolph H. 2009. Structured Analytic Techniques For Intelligence Analysis. Working Draft 
March 2009. Page numbers of the draft might differ from those in the final publication. 17-18 
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then be critiqued by the individual and other knowledgeable analysts. It is 
therefore a collaborative effort which has the additional benefit of helping the 
analyst see the problem from diverse perspectives.  
- Quantitative methods using expert-generated data: In most cases pertaining to 
Intelligence Analysis hard empirical data is not available. In the absence of 
empirical data, many quantitative methods are designed to use quantitative data 
generated by expert opinion, especially subjective probability judgements. Special 
procedures are used to elicit these judgements. This category includes methods 
such as Bayesian inference, dynamic modelling, and simulation. Already in 1978, 
Nicholas Schweitzer found that Bayesian analysis in intelligence is a useful 
analytical tool alongside that of traditional analysis. However, analysts still shy 
away from what is perceived to be a difficult method and rely mainly on 
traditional, qualitative methods.144 
- Quantitative methods using empirical data: Quantifiable empirical data is so 
different to expert-generated data that the methods and types of problems the data 
is used for to analyse are also quite different. Econometric modelling is one 
common example belonging to this method. Empirical data is collected by various 
types of sensors and used, for example, in the analysis of weapons systems.  
4.2.1 The unaided analytical judgment/Intuitive approach 
In ordinary circumstances, analysts will unwittingly and intuitively use one or more of the 
four main modes of reasoning, namely induction, deduction, abduction and the scientific 
method.  
4.2.1.1  Inductive reasoning  
When analysts make a generalisation or discover relationships among phenomena on the basis 
of observations or other evidence, they use inductive reasoning. This usually results from a 
learnt experience, or intuition where the analyst can postulate causal relationships.145  Since 
the beginning of the Intelligence Analysis profession, analysts have used inductive reasoning 
(also called the historical method) because that is what they have been taught at university in 
the social sciences. Most analysts still use this method, mainly because that is what they are 
                                                 
144  Wheaton, Kristan J., Lee, Jennifer and Deshmukh, Hemangini. 2009. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(1). 
41.  Students from the Intelligence Studies Programme at Mercyhurst College are conducting research on 
the use of Bayesian methods in Intelligence Analysis. Their research and findings are available at 
http://advat.blogspot.com.  
145  Krizan, Lisa, 1999. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, 30 
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used to, and also because they have not been exposed to other methods and their associated 
tools and techniques.146  
Marrin147 expands on the inductive approach by indicating that analysts have a two-step 
analytic approach. They use intuitive “pattern and trend analysis” – consisting of the 
identification of repeated behaviour over time and an increase or decrease in that behaviour – 
to uncover changes in some aspect of international behaviour that could have implications for 
national security. Once patterns are detected, they rely on ad hoc rules or mental models 
derived from the study in relevant theory – for example, economics, political science or 
psychology – to determine the significance of the pattern.  
Collier148 argues that the inductive method leaves too much room for conjecture, superstition 
and opinion. Most inductive analyses lack systematic procedures and thus provide little basis 
for establishing the reliability and validity of their research findings. Another problem might 
be the linearity of the inductive approach. Here the analyst does not mindfully extend his 
mental models to also include “what if?” scenarios and other non-linear techniques to ensure 
that the probability of surprises has been addressed. Of course, these will exclude strategic 
surprises, as previously discussed in the thesis because they are impossible to detect. 
4.2.1.2  Deductive reasoning 
Deduction is the process of reasoning from general rules to specific cases,149 where the 
hypothesis is tested, contrary to inductive reasoning where the hypothesis is created. Krizan150 
cites Clauser and Weir who warn that deductive reasoning should be used carefully in the 
Intelligence Analysis domain, as Intelligence Analysis rarely deals with closed systems, so 
premises based on another set of facts, applied to a new problem and assumed to be true may 
in fact be false and lead to incorrect conclusions. 
4.2.1.3  Abductive reasoning  
Abduction is the informal or pragmatic mode of reasoning to describe how we “reason to the 
best explanation” in everyday life. Waltz states that abduction is the practical description of 
an interactive set of analysis and synthesis to arrive at a solution or explanation, creating and 
                                                 
146  Collier, Michael, W. 2005. Defense Intelligence Journal. 14(2), 30 states that “Intelligence Analysis seems 
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147  Marrin, Stephen P. 2003. Intelligencer, 13(2) Online version. 
148  Collier, Michael, W. 2005. Defense Intelligence Journal,14(2), 17 
149  Krizan, Lisa, 1999. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, 30 
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evaluating multiple hypotheses.151 This process differs from induction in that it adds to the set 
of hypotheses available to the analyst. In inductive reasoning, the hypothesised relationship 
among pieces of evidence is considered to be already existing, needing only to be perceived 
and articulated by the analyst. In abduction, the analyst creatively generates a set of 
hypotheses and then sets about examining whether the available evidence unequivocally 
supports one or the other. The latter step, namely testing the evidence, is a deductive 
inference.152  
Abductive reasoning may also be called intuition or “gut feeling” when the analyst just knows 
something has or will happen, but has no evidence for the hypothesis. The analyst will then 
set out collecting information that might confirm or disprove the hypothesis. This reasoning is 
fallible as it is subject to cognitive errors but it has the ability to extend understanding the 
intelligence problem beyond the original premises. 
4.2.1.4  Scientific method 
In the scientific method induction is used to develop the hypothesis, and deduction is used to 
test it. The object is observed and the analyst might formulate a hypothesis to explain the 
conclusions suggested by the evidence. Experiments are concluded to test the validity of the 
hypothesis. If they do not validate the hypothesis, a new one must be formulated and new 
experiments done to validate this hypothesis.153 In Intelligence Analysis, there are no 
experiments and direct observation of the subject, but the analyst can develop hypotheses or 
explanations from information obtained from various sources. The hypotheses can then be 
examined for plausibility and iteratively tested against new information. In the early years of 
Intelligence Analysis, scholars and practitioners alike relied solely on the scientific method. In 
fact, there are still some who say that “as Intelligence Analysis is a science” improvement 
should be based on the formulation of better hypotheses, better data and improved objectivity. 
However, this is not a reflection of the reality in current social science, least of all in an 
applied social science like Intelligence Analysis.  
4.2.2  Alternative/structured analysis approach 
Numerous articles have been written during the past few years on analytical tools and 
methods which can improve Intelligence Analysis. Initially these methods were called 
“alternative” analyses running counter to the traditional intuitive Intelligence Analysis that 
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generates forecasts or explanations based on logical processing of available evidence. 
However, this term implied that it should only be used as an alternative or substitute method 
such as “Red Teaming”, and only under exceptional circumstances when an analysis is of 
such importance that a wrong conclusion cannot be afforded. This notion has been slowly 
changed by the recent renaming of such methods as “structured methods”, indicating that they 
represent tools in addition to traditional, intuitive, analysis methods, and are not merely 
alternatives. 
The most difficult challenge facing the introduction of these new models, techniques and 
methods might be to convince analysts and their managers to learn about and apply them. In 
his ethnographical study of US analysts, Johnston154 found that the fact that analysts view 
their work as “tradecraft,” mystifies it and reinforces the belief that it is exclusive and unique 
compared to other disciplines. Tradecraft implies that good or best practices are learnt only by 
the initiated and handed down through “elaborate rituals of professional indoctrination.” By 
implication, it means that existing methods and practices are informal, unverifiable and 
inexplicable. He comes to the conclusion that viewing Intelligence Analysis as a craft is 
harmful to the profession and that the formalisation of methods would lead to the 
development of Intelligence Analysis as a scientific discipline.  
In a research experiment providing two complex scenarios to analysts from different 
backgrounds, Folker155 proved that the use of structured methods, in this case hypothesis 
testing from Morgan, can improve the results of an analysis significantly. He found that, in 
contrast to the control group, the test group that used the hypothesis-testing method was better 
able to identify relevant factors and assumptions, formulate and consider different outcomes, 
weigh diverse pieces of evidence and make decisions based on the information. The control 
group’s thinking was not as clear and they jumped to conclusions without having had access 
to the actual evidence to support their hypotheses. Folker suggests that analysts would need 
training in the different methods so that they will also be able to select that method most 
suited to a problem. 
Despite the evidence that structured analytical tools and techniques might be useful in 
Intelligence Analysis, these tools and techniques have only been used on an ad hoc basis in 
the analysis process, have been regarded as nice-to-haves or bonuses to supplement traditional 
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methods and did not have any impact on decision-making as the clients were unconcerned 
about how the analysts arrived at an answer – they just wanted an answer.156  
The use of structured methods depends both on the individual knowledge worker/intelligence 
analyst’s efforts to improve his/her cognitive abilities, and external factors – most of them of 
an organisational nature. The organisational culture might not be ready to implement 
alternative analyses as analysts are perceived to be persons who write reports, while those 
who use models and quantitative techniques are seen as “methodologists” and not real 
analysts. Time constraints and tight production schedules are also inhibiting factors. Efforts to 
introduce structured methods have been met by scepticism and hostility, although after the 
implementation, the analysts stated that it was interesting and worthwhile.157  
Johnston158 argues that because the domain analysts/experts do not have the time to 
understand, learn and apply all the various different analytical tools in addition to their main 
tasks of monitoring and forewarning, methodologists or methodology experts should be 
introduced to assist the domain analysts in ensuring that analytical rigour is achieved. The 
danger of this viewpoint is that the use of structured methods is not inculcated in the mindsets 
and work processes of analysts, but seen as a peripheral, ad hoc activity.  
Randolph Pherson, a former CIA analyst, published his Handbook of Analytical Tools & 
Techniques in 2008. In it he states that the application of these techniques in intelligence has 
“greatly reduced the chances of getting an analysis fundamentally wrong or of being surprised 
by a future outcome.”159 Structured analysis seeks to help analysts and policy makers 
“stretch” their thinking through structured techniques that challenge underlying assumptions 
and broaden the range of possible outcomes. Properly applied, they serve as a hedge against 
cognitive biases and challenge assumptions or identify alternative outcomes, depending on the 
technique employed, with the results captured, implicitly or explicitly, in a written product 
delivered to relevant policy makers.160   
The main advantage of structured analytical methods might be found in the fact that they 
force analysts to make their reasoning processes transparent and verifiable. They specifically 
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ensure that assumptions, preconceptions and mindsets are not taken for granted but explicitly 
examined and tested. The use and the documentation of these techniques also help at a later 
stage to review the analysis and identify the cause of any error.161 Jones adds other benefits of 
structured analysis, e.g. that the method is aimed at being a separate exercise, systematic and 
sufficient for scrutiny, while instinctive/intuitive analysis only aims at satisfying. Usually the 
decision or solution in intuitive analysis is frequently flawed and less effective, while 
structured analysis tends to be more comprehensive and effective. (See Figure 11). 
 
 Intuitive analysis Structured analysis 
Mind Closed Open 
Method 
Satisfice Separate 
Systematic 
Sufficient 
All alternatives Not considered Considered 
Decision/solution 
Frequently flawed 
Less effective 
More comprehensive 
More effective 
Figure 11: Difference between intuitive and structured analysis162 
 
The use of structured analysis methods might not only improve the quality of Intelligence 
Analysis, but can also strengthen the credibility of analysis that is often prone to criticism of 
real or perceived politicisation and other organisational pressures.   
In their new book, Heuer and Pherson163 categorise 50 structured analytic methods into eight 
categories which correlate with common cognitive pitfalls and indicate the functions the 
analysts need to perform to overcome these pitfalls. The methods are either intelligence 
specific, have been developed by the authors, other intelligence training institutions, or taken 
from other disciplines. Some of the methods, of which many are new in Intelligence Analysis, 
are discussed hereunder in an effort to underscore the importance of the breadth of cognitive 
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skills those “thinking for a living” should develop to be able to function adequately in all 
domains of the Cynefin framework. 
4.2.2.1  Decomposition and Visualisation  
 Techniques in this category are used to overcome the limitations of our working memory 
through: 1) breaking the problem or issue down into its component parts so that each part can 
be considered separately, and 2) jotting down all these elements in some organised manner to 
facilitate visualisation of how they interrelate as the problem is addressed. Techniques here 
include: 
- Checklists, which can be used to remind the analyst about the steps to be followed, 
sources to be tasked or the preferences of the client/s. 
- Issue Definition, which is particularly helpful in preventing “mission creep,” 
which results when analysts unwittingly take the direction of analysis away from 
the core intelligence question or issue at hand, often as a result of the complexity 
of the problem or a perceived lack of information.164 Asking “why?” five times, 
broadening, narrowing and deepening the focus are all relevant  in assisting to 
determine the actual focus of the intelligence problem. 
- Chronologies and Timelines, which assist the analyst in visualising important 
events in chronological order that in turn assist in detecting patterns, information 
gaps and determining key events.  
- Sorting. This allows for the use of categories in a spreadsheet to assist in 
determining common denominators, especially when analysing large data sets of 
bank accounts, telephone numbers, etc. 
- Ranking, Scoring and Prioritising. This technique is used with any list according 
to the item’s importance, desirability, priority, value, probability, or any other 
criteria. It is usually applied in conjunction with other tools such as hypothesis 
generation or issue definition. 
- Matrices, which are generic analytic tools for sorting and organising data in a 
manner that facilitates comparison and analysis and are used in conjunction with 
many other techniques. 
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- Network Analysis, also called Association Analysis, Link Analysis, and Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). This maps and measures the frequency of contacts or 
flows of information, money, or goods between people, groups, organisations, 
computers, websites, and any other information/processing entities. The nodes in 
the network are the people and groups while the links show relationships or flows 
between the nodes.165  In most cases, the sheer number of possible links between 
entities like telephones in figure 12 necessitates software applications. Despite the 
help of software tools like this, the analyst still needs to analyse the information, 
identify information gaps and make operational recommendations.  
  
  Figure 12: Telephone Link Analysis Chart166 
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- Process Maps and Gantt Charts are useful for visualising complex processes or 
projects for, amongst others, drug manufacturing and distribution, weapons of 
mass destruction manufacturing and constitutional or legal processes. 
- Mind Maps (figure 13) and Concept Maps, which are useful for providing analysts 
with simplified visual outlines of complex problems or issues, making the 
categorisation and logical flow in arguments and reports easier. 
 
 
Figure 13: Mind map used in crime intelligence167 
 
4.2.2.2  Idea Generation Techniques168 
Techniques in this category aim at stimulating the analyst’s mind with new possibilities to 
investigate and view an intelligence problem from different angles, for example: 
- Structured Brainstorming is a valuable group technique used in all fields to obtain 
a better and broader perspective of an issue or problem. It is most useful when 
done in a group which opens up the possibilities of new perspectives. 
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- Nominal Group Technique is a structured brainstorming technique where power 
relationships are neutralised by giving each participant a chance to contribute to 
the discussion in a round-robin setup. 
- Starbursting is a process through which a multitude of questions based on who? 
what? where? when? why? and how? are generated through brainstorming. For the 
intelligence analyst, this technique is helpful when determining all the information 
gaps that need to be addressed in a collection plan. 
- Morphological Analysis is most useful when analysts are confronted with 
complex, non-quantifiable problems for which little data is available and the 
chances for surprise are great. It can be used, for example, to identify all possible 
variations of a threat, all possible ways a crisis might occur between two countries, 
all possible ways a set of driving forces might interact, or the full range of all 
potential outcomes in any ambiguous situation.172 This two-step process includes 
brainstorming where different categories of a problem are identified, after which 
the analysts force associations between and among the different elements to come 
up with as many permutations of possibilities as possible. This technique also 
assists in scenario development. 
4.2.2.3  Scenarios, Indicators, Signposts 
When working with so many uncertainties, the best intelligence analysts can do is to 
determine the drivers that might change a situation and spell out the different possible 
futures/scenarios. Scenario analysis is a product of the management sciences173, but is 
routinely used in the intelligence discipline, albeit sometimes in an eclectic manner. The value 
of the scenario technique is fivefold:174 
- It generates indicators to monitor for signs that a particular future is becoming 
more, or less likely. 
- It helps analysts and decision-makers anticipate what would otherwise be 
surprising developments by forcing them to challenge assumptions and consider 
plausible “wild-card” scenarios or discontinuous events.  
                                                 
172  Heuer, Richards J. and Pherson, Randolph H. 2009. Structured Analytic Techniques For Intelligence 
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- It produces a broader analytic framework for calculating the costs, risks and 
opportunities represented by different outcomes.  
- It provides an effective means of weighing multiple unknown or unknowable 
factors and presenting a set of plausible outcomes.  
- It binds a problem by identifying plausible combinations of uncertain factors.  
Heuer and Pherson propose three scenario techniques which increase in complexity:   
- Basic Scenario Analysis, where the analyst would identify the drivers, forces and 
events that are likely to influence the future, group them together in at least four 
plausible scenarios, and list the implications of the scenario for the decision-
maker. Indicators associated with each scenario can also be identified and 
monitored to establish which scenario is unfolding.  
- Alternative Futures Analysis (Figure 15), is usually used with a larger group 
project where two drivers for critical events are identified, namely: 1) the 
effectiveness of government, and 2) the strength of civil society. At each end of 
the continuum, two ends are identified, creating a 2x2 matrix. A “story” is created 
for each scenario, indictors are developed and monitored.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Alternative Futures Technique175 
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- Multiple Scenario Generation (Figure 16) is a more complex technique where 
more than four scenarios are developed according to a multitude of drivers. 
Analysts would go through several alternative scenario exercises with different 
drivers and then choose, according to set criteria, those scenarios most relevant to 
the brief of the client, including those likely to happen, as well as some “wild 
cards” and worst case scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Multiple Scenario Generation Technique – 
here only 1 driver in a worst case scenario176 
 
- Indicators and Signposts listing is an excellent way of preparing the mind to 
recognise early signs of change. More often than not, analysts do not see the 
gradual changes taking shape in a society, making it difficult for them to grasp 
new developments for what they really are. This reluctance to change a perception 
in response to new evidence is natural. Listing indicators or signposts for each 
hypothesis or scenario at the outset of the investigation of an intelligence problem 
opens the mind for all possibilities of permutations of scenarios.  
- The Indicators Validator technique flows from the listing of indicators where the 
next step is to rate the indicators according their likelihood of happening. Those 
indicators with the fewest “highly unlikely” rating are eliminated, urging the 
analyst to develop new indicators or scenarios that might be more feasible. 
4.2.2.4  Hypothesis Generation and Testing177 
Although subconsciously analysts hypothesise about each piece of information and validate 
the hypothesis intuitively, structured analytical tools assist in looking at a wider range of 
hypotheses, thereby opening their minds to different possibilities and explanations. It also 
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prevents them from “satisfying” or being satisfied with the first explanation that comes to 
mind or worse, only investigating the hypothesis that they agree with and ignoring any other 
option. In this technique, the focus is on refuting hypotheses, not confirming them. This 
makes that hypothesis which cannot be refuted, strong enough for further investigation. 
Hypothesis generation is characterised by the following:  
- Multiple Hypothesis Generation is useful when there are many factors involved in 
the analysis, and there is a high level of uncertainty about the outcome of the 
analysis or when analysts or decision-makers hold competing views. The process 
starts with the generation of as many hypotheses as possible through situational 
logic, application of different theories or historical comparison. The hypotheses 
are then rated according to credibility and listed for further enquiry.  
- Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH - Figure 17) is used when hypotheses 
should be generated about what might be the truth or what might happen. It is not a 
scenario development exercise. ACH involves identifying a complete set of 
alternative explanations or outcomes (presented as hypotheses), assessing the 
consistency or inconsistency of each item of evidence with each hypothesis, and 
the selection of the hypothesis that best fits the evidence. The analysis is preceded 
by trying to refute rather than confirm each of the hypotheses. The most likely 
hypothesis is the one with the least evidence against it, not the one with the most 
evidence for it. The full ACH process follows the following eight steps.178 
Participants should: 
1.     Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with 
different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities. 
2.     Make a list of evidence and arguments (including assumptions and logical 
deductions) for and against each hypothesis. 
3.     Enter hypotheses and evidence into the matrix. Assess the consistency or 
inconsistency of each item of evidence for each hypothesis. There is an option 
also to assess the credibility and relevance of each item of evidence to 
determine how much weight it should have in the analysis. 
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4.     Refine the matrix, reconsider the hypotheses, identify gaps in the evidence that 
may need to be filled to refute hypotheses, check the consistency of the 
evidence ratings, solicit critical input from other analysts. Use the software 
functions to identify and compare different types of evidence with special 
focus on the most diagnostic evidence. 
5.     Compare own conclusions about the relative likelihood of the hypotheses with 
the Inconsistency or Weighted Inconsistency Scores generated by the software. 
If they are not similar, figure out why and what can be learned from that. 
6.     Do a sensitivity analysis. Consider how own conclusions would be affected if 
key evidence or arguments were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different 
interpretation. Double check the validity of key evidence and arguments that 
determine the outcome of own analysis.  
7.    Report conclusions. Include discussion of alternatives that were considered and 
why they were rejected. 
8.     Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a 
different course than expected. 
 
Figure 17: Screen shot from ACH software on the Washington DC sniper179 
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- Argument mapping is used for diagramming the structure of an argument to 
include any kind of argumentative activity such as reasoning, inference, debating, 
and cases. Typically, an argument map is a “box and arrow” diagram with boxes 
corresponding to propositions and arrows corresponding to relationships such as 
evidential support. Argument mapping is similar to other mapping activities such 
as mind mapping and concept mapping, but focuses on the logical, evidential or 
inferential relationships among propositions. 
4.2.2.5  Cause and Effect Analysis180 
In addition to the normal thinking biases, intelligence analysts should be wary of making 
assumptions about the cause and effect of certain events or indicators. Deception, 
disinformation, ambiguous information, or the total lack of information makes untested 
assumptions and conclusions risky. Structured analytical techniques assist the analyst to refine 
and strengthen interpretation of the current and future situations. Two of the tools are: 
- Key Assumptions Check, used when analysts use expert judgment, situational logic 
and understanding of similar situations to try and explain a new intelligence 
problem. The assumptions might not be applicable to the new situation; therefore, 
they need to interrogate their mindset so that they can critically evaluate its 
relevancy. Using this technique, an analyst and outsiders with little knowledge 
about the issue thrash out all the assumptions that they have. The outsiders bring in 
new thoughts and might expose fallacies in logic. First the group interrogates all 
possible assumptions by critically challenging statements like “would never”, 
“usually”, etc. After all the assumptions have been listed, questions are asked 
about each of them like: “When will this not be true?” “Is this still valid today?”, 
“If it is invalid, what will the impact on the analysis be?” The assumptions are then 
categorised into three categories: 1) Basically solid, 2) Correct with some caveats, 
and 3) Unsupported or questionable – these are the key uncertainties. The latter is 
then discarded and the rest refined to make sure the assumptions are still valid as 
the intelligence picture evolves.  
- Outside-In Thinking, which is used to force the analyst to consider all related 
complex issues that might impact on a current or future situation. It assists in 
identifying all variables from a global, political, economic, social, legal, 
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environmental, military and technological perspective. By casting their net broadly 
at the beginning, analysts are more likely to see an important dynamic or include a 
relevant alternative hypothesis. The process can provide new insights and uncover 
relationships that were not evident from the start. These usually create new 
information gaps and hypotheses that need to be investigated further. This technique is 
similar to STEEP (i.e. Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political) 
or PESTEL/PESTELO (i.e. Political, Economic, Social, Technological, 
Environmental, Legal and Organisational) analyses used in management sciences.  
4.2.2.6  Reframing Techniques181 
These techniques aim at assisting analysts to change their frames of reference/mindset about 
an analytic problem through changing the questions or the perspectives from which they ask 
them. Analysts can use reframing when they need to generate new ideas, or see old ideas from 
a new perspective, or any other time they sense a need for fresh thinking. The techniques 
include: 
- Pre-mortem Analysis (also sometimes called crystalballing); a technique where the 
analysts put themselves in the future and pretend that their analysis on an 
intelligence issue was wrong. They then have to interrogate what could have gone 
wrong and what failure (analytical or organisational) might have led to the failure. 
This enables them to pre-empt and address inconsistencies and other variables, 
thereby reducing the risk of analytical failure.   
- What If? Analysis, which serves a function similar to that of scenario analysis – it 
creates awareness that prepares the mind to recognise early signs of a significant 
change, and it may enable the decision-maker to plan ahead for that contingency. 
The analyst imagines that the event has occurred, then analyses how the event 
could have happened, what the indicators might have been, the stakeholders’ 
actions, etc. 
- Red-Hat Analysis; forecasting the behaviour of another individual or group by 
trying to replicate how that other person or group thinks by putting oneself “in 
their shoes” or putting on “their hat.” To do this effectively, without mirror 
imaging, requires a substantial area and cultural expertise. 
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than not, these were deleted from important documents.182 Coordination of intelligence 
reports between different organisations is an arduous process fraught with different 
viewpoints, access to different types of intelligence and political turf wars. Challenge analysis 
techniques will assist in providing the best possible product to the client where major 
differences exist. These techniques differ from competition analysis where there is only a 
win-lose situation and analysts do not learn anything from their counterparts’ position, but 
only entrench themselves in their own and those of the organisational stovepipes, thus 
preventing collaboration and communication.183 
Heuer and Pherson184 group many of the already discussed techniques in this challenge 
analysis category, because they inherently dare the analysts to rethink their respective 
viewpoints. These techniques are also called alternative analysis, contrarian or red team 
analysis. Because of the uncertainty of future developments, they make sense in Intelligence 
Analysis as the decision-maker should have access to all divergent points of view. Personal 
challenge analysis techniques like the self-critique technique addressed above (in reframing), 
is not usually seen as part of challenge analysis, the latter being seen as a more formal, 
deliberate seeking of at least one other viewpoint of an intelligence problem. The techniques 
can be detailed as follows: 
- Adversarial Collaboration is a technique developed by the Nobel Prize winner 
Daniel Kahneman, whereby differing parties agree to work together and publish a 
joint product which will also outline their disagreements on the empirical test 
results conducted by an arbitrator. Although empirical testing is not possible in 
Intelligence Analysis, this technique can be used when both parties are willing to 
consider each other’s position and then agree to include both in an intelligence 
product if the differences cannot be resolved. Techniques to assist in the 
achievement of such collaboration will include: 1) key assumption checks, 2) 
analysis of competing hypotheses, 3) argument mapping, and 4) collaborative 
debates. In the latter, both sides exchange counterarguments resulting in one side 
                                                 
182  This was the writer’s own experience when interdepartmental intelligence documents or contentious issues 
and events were analysed. 
183  Heuer and Pherson’s valid argument for not using the term competitive analysis or Team A/Team B 
analysis, although that was the term used by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2005 when it instructed the US intelligence community 
to do more competitive analysis.  Heuer, Richards J. and Pherson, Randolph H. 2009. Structured Analytic 
Techniques For Intelligence Analysis. Working Draft March 2009, Chapter 9:12 
184  Heuer, Richards J. and Pherson, Randolph H. 2009. Structured Analytic Techniques For Intelligence 
Analysis. Working Draft March 2009, Chapter 9 
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prevailing with its stronger argument, or both sides’ arguments are strong enough 
to be dealt with jointly in a report, or, there is too much uncertainty to make a 
judgment and no product is written, or the weaker side is invited to write a “second 
opinion” separate document. In most instances where there is no agreement 
between analysts of different units, all the analysts usually escalate the problem to 
their manager, most of the time not reflecting the arguments of the other analysts. 
Instead of having a balanced, multi-perspective overview of the problem, the 
managers will return with the same entrenched perspectives represented by their 
analysts, making the situation more confounding, and 5) in the joint escalation 
technique, the analysts prepare an integrated statement reflecting all the different 
viewpoints thereby creating a better understanding and opportunity for the 
managers to make a more informed decision.  
- Structured Debates as a technique is used when none of the other techniques were 
successful in obtaining an outcome. Written arguments are read to the other, 
opposing side and the audience, after which the opposing side has to refute the 
arguments. This reflects the scientific method where the hypothesis with the least 
evidence against it is the most probable. If neither side’s arguments can be 
effectively refuted, then arguments for and against both sides should be recognised 
in the report. Clients of Intelligence Analysis stand to gain greater benefit by 
weighing well-argued, conflicting views than by merely reading an assessment that 
masks substantive differences between analysts or drives the analysis toward the 
lowest common denominator.   
- Devil’s Advocacy is a process whereby an independent outsider is allowed to 
critique a proposed analytic judgment, plan, or decision, and to build the best 
possible case against it. This is not the same as self-critique and is usually initiated 
by the client or manager to find out what is wrong with an analysis conclusion 
arrived at unanimously, what can go wrong in future, and what the impact might 
be for decision-making.  
- The Delphi Method is used for eliciting ideas, judgments or forecasts from a group 
of external experts who may be geographically dispersed. It differs from a survey 
in that there are two or more rounds of questioning. After the first round of 
questions, all the answers and explanations of the answers are distributed to all 
participants, often anonymously. The expert participants are then given an 
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opportunity to modify their previous responses, if so desired based on what they 
have learned from the responses of the other participants. The Delphi Method can 
be used quite effectively in Intelligence Analysis, especially since outside expert 
advice is thereby promoted by the major intelligence organisations. It is important 
to remember that the value of this technique lies in the variety of viewpoints, and 
that there should be no attempt to force the opinions into one shared opinion.  
4.2.2.8  Decision Support Analysis185 
Heuer and Pherson also developed techniques, by modifying some used outside the 
intelligence environment, to enable analysts to see the problem from the decision-maker’s 
perspective. Intelligence analysts can use these techniques as they structure all the relevant 
information in a format that makes it easier for the manager, commander, planner or other 
decision-maker, to make a choice. These techniques assist in describing the forces that are 
expected to shape the decision, then describe several potential outcomes, and subsequently 
identify indicators or signs to look for that could provide early warning of the direction in 
which events are headed. In addition to assisting own clients, these techniques can also help to 
analyse a target country, organisation or government. Three of these techniques are listed and 
described hereunder: 
- Complexity Manager is a method designed by Heuer which is used to assess the 
chances of success or failure of a new or proposed policy, to identify opportunities 
for influencing the outcome of any situation, determine what would need to change 
in order to achieve a specified goal, or identify unintended consequences from the 
pursuit of a policy goal. In brief, it helps decision-makers ask better questions and 
anticipate problems. It also assists analysts in analysing target organisations, 
governments or syndicates and can be used for both operational and strategic 
purposes. Analysts are generally not able to factor in all the different permutations 
of interacting variables in a complex environment. This technique enables them to 
find the best possible answer by organising information in a systematic manner 
about many relevant variables. After defining the problem, the analyst conducts a 
structured brainstorming session to identify all the relevant variables, whether they 
are static or dynamic (predictably or unpredictably dynamic). These variables are 
then entered down the side and again across the top of the cross-impact matrix. 
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The analyst, preferably working in a small team, considers each pair of variables 
and asks the question: “What is the impact of this variable on the paired variable?” 
A rating of the direction and strength of the impact is entered in the appropriate 
cell and notes are kept of the discussion. The next step is to take one variable at a 
time and draft several paragraphs that summarise how other variables impact on 
this variable and how they are in turn impacted on by this variable. Using this 
information about the individual variables, the analyst then draws conclusions 
about the system as a whole in answer to questions such as: “What is the most 
likely outcome?” “What things could happen to cause a different outcome?” 
“What desirable or undesirable side effects should be anticipated?” “What 
opportunities are available to influence the outcome?”  
- A SWOT Analysis (Figure 19) is commonly used by all kinds of organisations to 
evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats involved in any 
project or plan of action. The strengths and weaknesses are internal to the 
organisation while the opportunities and threats are characteristics of the external 
environment. Because the technique considers an organisation’s strengths and 
weaknesses against the opportunities and threats in the environment in which it 
operates, the plans or action recommendations that develop from the use of this 
technique are often quite practical and useful in both strategic and operational 
realms. Again, in addition to own policies and decisions, a SWOT analysis is ideal 
to analyse an organised crime syndicate, terrorist group or government. In this 
technique, the analyst should start by stating the objective, after which the SWOT 
table is filled in by listing the respective strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats that are expected to facilitate or hinder the achievement of the objective. 
The significance of the impact of the attributes and condition on the achievement 
of the objective is far more important than the length of the list. It is often 
desirable to list the items in each quadrant in order of their significance or assign 
values to them on a scale of 1 to 5. For strategic purposes (figure 21), the analyst 
identifies possible strategies for achieving the objective. This is done by asking the 
following questions:1) “How can we use each strength?” 2) “How can we improve 
each weakness?” 3) “How can we exploit each opportunity?” 4) “How can we 
mitigate each threat?”  
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Figure 19: Strategic SWOT Analysis Template186 
 
- Pros-Cons-Fixes-and-Faults. This represents an easy technique to make a quick 
appraisal of a new idea or a more systematic analysis of a choice between two 
options without having to jump to conclusions. It also organises the elements of 
the problem logically and objectively, helping the decision-maker to make a 
careful and emotionally detached, considered choice. First the analyst is required 
to list all the pros in favour of this decision or choice while thinking broadly and 
creatively. Then all the cons, or arguments against what is proposed are listed, 
reviewed and consolidated. At that point the analyst must make a choice. If the 
goal is to challenge an initial judgment that the idea will not work, the cons must 
be taken, one at a time, and see if they can be “fixed.” That means trying to arrive 
at a way to neutralise their adverse influence or even convert them into pros. This 
is intended to counter any unnecessary or biased negativity about the idea. There 
are at least four ways an argument listed as a con might be “fixed”: 1) propose a 
modification of the con that would significantly lower the risk of its being a 
problem, 2) identify a preventive measure that would significantly reduce the 
chances of the con being a problem, 3) do contingency planning that includes a 
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78 
 
change of course if certain indicators are observed, and 4) identify a need for 
further research or collect information to confirm or refute the assumption that the 
con is a problem. If the goal is to challenge an initial optimistic assumption that 
the idea will work and should be pursued, take the pros, one at a time, and see if 
they can be “faulted.” That means attempting to figure out how the pro might fail 
to materialise or have undesirable consequences. This is intended to counter any 
wishful thinking or unjustified optimism about the idea. There are at least three 
ways a pro might be “faulted”: 1) identify a reason why the pro will not work or 
the benefit will not be received, 2) identify an undesirable side effect that might 
accompany the benefit, 3) identify a need for further research or collect 
information to confirm or refute the assumption that the pro will work or be 
beneficial. A third option is to combine both approaches; fault the pros and fix the 
cons. Compare the pros, including any faults, against the cons by including the 
fixes. Weigh the balance of one against the other, and make a choice. The choice is 
based on the analyst’s professional judgment, not on any numerical calculation of 
the number or value of pros versus cons.  
4.3 Conclusion 
The value of understanding how Intelligence Analysis is done and the studies of the various 
scholars and practitioners should form the basis for deliberate thinking about thinking, or 
mindfulness. Analysts should be aware of their frames of reference, the intuitive methods they 
use, as well as of the other, more structured methods available to add value, especially where 
individual interpretation is insufficient. The various analytical tools and techniques described 
in the thesis will assist the analysts and the decision-makers in grasping, verbalising and 
communicating their thought processes regarding the complexities of any intelligence 
problem much more effectively as they move between the knowable to the complex or chaotic 
domain. This makes the argumentation phase of Intelligence Analysis more rigorous and 
open-ended, thereby further increasing the contributory value of the analyst to the intelligence 
domain. Analysts should ideally be trained in all the different tools and techniques, so that 
they will be able to apply the most appropriate tool, whether intuitive/unaided or structured, to 
a specific problem and for a stage of the intelligence process (see Figure 20).   
The main constraints on the application of these new techniques might be tight deadlines and 
the prevailing organisational culture. Regarding time, it might be necessary for the respective 
organisations, management teams and analysts to ensure that there is sufficient time for the 
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application of more advanced and complex methods. The greatest challenge might lie in 
convincing analysts, their managers and clients of the benefits of the structured analytical 
methods. In some cases, analysts might already use some of these tools and techniques 
subconsciously, and with exposure to the explicit step-by-step approach might be able to 
improve and refine those tacit knowledge processes.  A gradual and natural introduction to 
these methods in the ordinary flow of processes and intelligence products might be more 
effective than large-scale and forced realigning of thinking. The creation of training 
opportunities, as well as the education of clients to demand evidence of the application of the 
techniques might assist in this process. The more collaborative sensemaking will enable the 
building of trust between different units of analysts, especially in those organisations where 
individual outputs are the norm and group collaboration a novel idea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Timeline for using analytical techniques throughout analytical project187 
                                                 
187  United States Government. 2009.  A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving 
Intelligence Analysis, 38 
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CHAPTER 5 
New Dimensions for Intelligence 
Analysis  
 
The sign of a healthy professional discipline will be the intelligence community’s willingness 
to experiment with theories of best practices and to lead change rather than be run over by it.  
Carmen Medina188 
 
The wider application of structured analytical techniques in intelligence will have a profound 
impact on analysts and their expertise, but may not be sufficient to reduce uncertainty in 
complex situations. The value of Heuer and Pherson’s new book lies in their attempt to 
transcend the boundaries between the knowable, individual expert domain to that where 
collaborative sensing is made in the complex domain. Unfortunately, the reality in the 
intelligence environment is that intelligence organisations throughout the world, also here in 
South Africa, only reflect the known and knowable domains with clearly defined threats, a 
product/output disposition, and entrained individual expert knowledge.   
However, new actors are required to play out their roles on a new stage: that of the complex 
domain. As indicated earlier in the thesis, new intelligence problems and targets are forcing 
the intelligence organisation also to operate in the complex domain, something for which it is 
ill-prepared to adapt to. In this domain, there are just too many possibilities and hypotheses 
that even the most sophisticated structured analytical technique or analytical software find it 
impossible to narrow down to the most plausible scenario. 
Structured analytical methods alone will not be able to bring about the “new” Intelligence 
Analysis. This chapter looks at that new individual and organisational behaviour, ideas, 
mental models and techniques from other disciplines that could solidify attempts to usher in a 
new era. These concepts and practices should complement and not replace189 those already 
evident in the known and knowable domains.  
                                                 
188  Medina, Carmen. 2008. in George, Roger Z and Bruce, James B. (eds). Analyzing intelligence: origins, 
obstacles and innovations. 247 
189  Burnett, Mark, Wooding, Pete and Prekop, Paul. 2005. Sense Making in the Australian Defence 
Organisation (ADO) Intelligence Community.  
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Applying research findings from different disciplines, such as psychology, decision-making 
and organisational theory in intelligence will undoubtedly broaden our understanding of the 
complexities that analysts, their organisations and clients face. This chapter also highlights the 
transdisciplinary nature of Intelligence Analysis, and strengthens efforts to professionalise and 
establish it as a separate discipline in the social sciences.  
The purpose of this chapter is therefore not to deal with the original theories, but to look at 
those scholars and practitioners who have applied them in intelligence.  
5.1  New cognitive models  
The effective knowledge workers (or intelligence analysts) are capable of working “in 
multiple domains simultaneously, moving in and out of those domains as needed, combining 
the physical, mental, the intuitive, and the emotional to continuously expand their knowledge, 
capabilities, capacity, networks, and perceptions. They are convergent thinkers who have 
knowledge of systems, complexity and critical thinking and who can use different approaches 
and techniques to better understand complex issues.”190 One would come across the concepts 
“powers of abstraction”, “conceptualisation” and “synthesis” skills, “out-of-the-box” and 
“heterogeneous thinking” quite often in knowledge-management literature.191 The research in 
cognitive and social abilities of the “global worker” informs which type of person intelligence 
agencies should recruit or co-opt; probably that kind of person who might not pass the 
outdated vetting procedures and psychological tests.  
5.1.1 The prismatic reasoning / thinking paradigm  
Systems theory scholar, Robert Flood, uses the metaphor prismatic thought to describe 
creative and transformational thinking. The metaphor uses the image of a prism splitting light 
into its component colours by double refraction, once on entering the prism and again on 
leaving it. This type of thought yields many different views of the same thing and the same 
view of many different things. The aim of prismatic thought is to challenge assumptions, 
provoke new thoughts and generate unexpected insights.192 Other theorists and scholars call 
this approach either multiple lenses or methodological pluralism which has been used in 
                                                 
190  Bennet, Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex 
Adaptive System.  214 
191  Leeds, Carol 2003. The Knowledge Worker. Rapid Assessment Process (RAP) Report, 4(1), 8-9 and Bennet, 
Alex and David. 2004. Organizational survival in the New World: The Intelligent Complex Adaptive 
System,  214 
192  Flood, Robert Louis, 1999. Rethinking the Fifth Discipline: learning within the unknowable. 123-124 
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various fields, including that of KM and public administration, which intelligence might be 
able to learn from.193  
The prismatic thinking concept, although not necessarily called that, has gained ground in 
Intelligence Analysis where scholars and practitioners alike move away from a mutually 
exclusive stance to that of promoting the application of multidimensional cognitive 
perspectives on intelligence issues. Jones states that, in addition to convergent thinking, we 
also need divergent thinking to ensure effective analysis and problem solving. Divergence 
opens the mind to creative alternatives, while convergence “winnows out the weak 
alternatives and focuses on, and chooses among, the strong.”194 Divergence helps analysts to 
analyse a problem more creatively while convergence assists in attaining closure. Analysts 
should not only understand these differences, but also be conscious of which mode they find 
themselves in and shift back to the other as required by the information and context. This, 
however, does not come naturally, and analysts should be taught how to achieve it.  
These are the kinds of cognitive skills analysts and knowledge workers should practise to 
hone the tools of their trade. In this sense, the intelligence analyst should use both intuitive 
and structured analytical techniques, and be mindful of which technique would be appropriate 
in which specific context, given the nature of the intelligence at hand. The debate on whether 
Intelligence Analysis is a science or an art is simply not relevant anymore. Moore and Krizan 
state that intuitive abilities, inherent aptitudes, rigorously applied skills, and acquired 
knowledge, all enable analysts to solve problems in a multidimensional manner, thereby 
avoiding the pitfalls of both scientism and adventurism. The former occurs when scientific 
methodology is excessively relied upon to reveal the “truth”; the latter manifests when 
“inspiration [is] unsupported by rigorous analysis.” 195  
In the same vein, Kerbel proposes a new conceptual model that raises the level by which both 
artistic and scientific approaches can be applied simultaneously – blending them in a 
complementary “alloy”.196  He agrees with Steven Marrin197 – who has written extensively on 
                                                 
193  Cairney, Paul. 2009. PSA Conference Manchester, April 2009  
194  Jones, Morgan D. 1998. The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 powerful techniques for problem solving, 49 
195  Moore, David T and Krizan, Lisa 2003. in Swenson, Russell G. (ed) 2003. Bringing Intelligence About: 
Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices, 100-101 
196  Kerbel, Josh. 2008. Parameters. 105 
197  Marrin, Stephen P. and Clemente, Jonathan D. 2006. International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 18(4), 707-729. and Marrin, Stephen. 2007. American Intelligence Journal. 25(1), 11-
13 
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the similarities between the Intelligence Analysis and medical professions – that the example 
of the medical profession should be followed where it is generally accepted that evidence and 
intuition dictate prognosis. Kerbel even proposes that the linear mechanical metaphor in 
intelligence should be changed to a biological, systemic one found in medicine where terms 
such as “susceptibility, symptomatic, ripeness, side effects, etc.” are used.198  
Linking this multidimensional thinking with intelligence in complexity, Wolfberg199 proposes 
a full-spectrum mindset (Figure 21) in which the analyst applies both intuitive and structured 
methods, assuming from the outset that there are multiple, interrelated mysteries that must be 
solved simultaneously across a broad spectrum of intelligence requirements using many 
possible explanations or overlapping pieces of explanations. This mindset will assist analysts 
who are confronted with mysteries (and not puzzles) for which they cannot identify the 
problem, because they are too vague or there are too many.   
 
 Figure 21: Wolfberg’s full-spectrum mindset model: Approaching the world as a mystery200 
 
5.1.2 New Intelligence Analysis cognitive models  
The reconsideration of analysts’ cognitive skills has also led to at least two new models or 
schema in an attempt to clarify what actually happens in the mind of the intelligence analyst. 
These models provide both a deeper understanding of and context to the intelligence process, 
and the role of the analyst in the process (as discussed in chapter 2), and contribute to the 
                                                 
198  Kerbel, Josh. 2008. Parameters, 108 
199  Wolfberg, Adrian. 2006. Military Review. July-August 2006, 36 
200  Wolfberg, Adrian. 2006. Military Review. July-August 2006, 39 
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realisation that mindfulness is crucial in the practice of thinking and knowledge work, so 
much more for those who “think for a living.”   
5.1.2.1  Waltz’s Integrated Reasoning Process 
Waltz designed the Integrated Reasoning Process201 (Figure 22) in which he integrated the 
formal and informal methods of reasoning for practical analysis-synthesis in the intelligence 
problem-solving environment. The flow process proceeds from a pool of evidence as well as a 
question posed about the evidence – a query to explain the evidence. This process of 
proceeding from an evidentiary pool to detections, explanations or discovery:  
- detects the presence of evidence that matches previously known premises, patterns 
or data 
- explains underlying processes that gave rise to the evidence, and  
- discovers new patterns in the evidence. 
 
Figure 22: Waltz' Integration of reasoning flows202 
                                                 
201  Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 175-180 
202  Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 177 
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The model illustrates four basic paths that can proceed from the pool of evidence: three 
fundamental reasoning modes and a fourth, feedback path: 
- Deduction: The evidence in the pool is tested against previously known patterns or 
templates that represent hypotheses of activities that we seek to detect. When the 
evidence fits the hypothesis template, we declare a match. When the evidence fits 
multiple hypotheses simultaneously, the likelihood of each hypothesis, determined 
by the strength of evidence for each, is assessed and reported. 
- Retroduction: This feedback path, so-called by CS Peirce, as another process of 
reasoning, occurs when the analyst conjectures (synthesises) a new conceptual 
hypothesis that causes a return to the pool of evidence to seek evidence that 
matches or tests this new hypothesis. 
- Abduction: The abduction process, like induction, creates explanatory hypotheses 
inspired by the pool of evidence and, like deduction, attempts to match items of 
evidence with each hypothesis to seek the best explanation. Here, the hypotheses 
are refined and new hypotheses conjectured. The process leads to comparison and 
ranking of the hypotheses, and ultimately, the best is chosen as the explanation. 
The analyst returns to the pool of evidence, as part of the abductive process, to 
seek support for these candidate explanations. The return path is again called 
retroduction. 
-  Induction: The path of induction considers the entire pool of evidence to seek 
general statements (hypotheses) about the evidence. This path does not seek 
matches with small sets of evidence, but rather attempts to find a new and 
generalised explanation for clusters with similar evidence. These generalisations 
are then tested across the evidence to determine the breadth of applicability before 
being declared as a new discovery.   
- In an effort to explain the Intelligence Analysis process further, Waltz203 typifies 
the analysis-synthesis process as an evidence-decomposing and model-building 
process. The latter is used to “marshal evidence, evaluate logical argumentation 
and provide a tool for explanation of how the evidence best fits the analyst’s 
conclusion. The model also helps the analyst in identifying what information is 
missing, what strong evidence supports the model and where negative evidence 
                                                 
203  Waltz, Edward. 2003. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, 180-186 
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- Argumentation space: The data is reviewed, correlated and grouped into categories 
of explanations, forming a set of high-level hypotheses to explain the observed 
data. Continuous searches into the data are done, while patterns are discovered, 
albeit some of them without all the data. These patterns then lead to the creation of 
hypotheses, which in turn are examined to determine which data supports or 
refutes it, and the hypotheses are ranked in likelihood and additionally needed 
data. In this space, the case is argued for each hypothesis/model in terms of 
completeness, sufficiency and feasibility.  
- Explanation phase: During synthesis, models are composed to serve as 
explanations or articulations of the hypothesis and the supporting evidence. Here 
structured analytical techniques are used. 
5.1.2.2  A Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) Model of Intelligence Analysis 
Since 2005, various empirical research studies were conducted on the cognitive processes of 
intelligence analysts to determine where technological tools might assist in their tasks. Moon 
and Hoffman205 state that the intelligence community’s persistent reliance on common 
assumptions about cognitive work – as opposed to a reliance on empirical research of how 
analysts actually do work – is the primary cause for none of the proposals for intelligence 
reform being implemented successfully. They propose in-depth research on the cognitive 
activities and competencies of Intelligence Analysis. 
Hutchins, Pirolli and Card206 performed a pivotal study on a number of intelligence analysts, 
using the CTA207 methodology. They identified various tacit cognitive activities that had not 
been addressed in previous analysis process models. In this model (Figure 24), the data flow 
(rectangular boxes) shows how raw information is transformed to reports through the process 
flow (circles). The processes and data are arranged by the degree of effort and information 
structure. This is a process with various feedback loops and two interacting sets of activities 
that circle around: 1) finding information – the foraging loop (seeking information, 
                                                 
205  Moon, Brian M. and Hoffman, Robert R. 2006. Proceedings of the Seventh International NDM Conference 
(Ed. J.M.C Schraagen), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 2005. 
206  Hutchins, Susan G, Pirolli, Peter L. and Card, Stuart K. 2007. in Pirolli, Peter L. 2007. Assisting People to 
become Independent Learners in the Analysis of Intelligence Final Technical Report, 7-48 
207  CTA refers to a group of methods that are extensively used in naturalistic decision-making applications. 
Gary Klein's definition of a CTA is "a method for capturing expertise and making it accessible for training 
and system design." Klein delineates the following five steps: (1) identifying sources of expertise; (2) 
assaying the knowledge; (3) extracting the knowledge; (4) codifying the knowledge; and (5) applying the 
knowledge. Klein, G. A., 1999. Sources of Power, How People Make Decisions.  173 
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scrutinising and filtering it; and reading and extracting information possibly into some 
schema); and 2) making sense of the information – the sensemaking loop (iterative 
development of a mental model or conceptualisation from the schema that best suits the 
evidence). External data sources are the raw evidence, which is reduced to become a 
“shoebox” – the much smaller subset of that external data that is relevant for processing. The 
evidence file represents those snippets extracted from items in the shoebox. Schemas are the 
re-representation or organised marshalling of the information so that it can be used more 
readily to draw conclusions. Hypotheses are the tentative representations of those conclusions 
with supporting arguments. The last iteration of the data flow is a presentation or an 
intelligence product. 
The cognitive-process flow is identified as: 
- Search and filter (2): External data sources provide a repository through which the 
analyst searches (queries). Results of those searches are filtered (judged) for 
relevance. An analyst filters incoming information or does an active search, 
collecting relevant documents into some store (the “shoebox” in the diagram) for 
further processing.  
- Read and extract (5): Information in the shoebox is read to extract nuggets of 
evidence that may be used to draw inferences, or support or disconfirm a theory. 
Relevant snippets from this store and the related low-level inferences are placed in 
evidence files. Evidence extracted at this stage may trigger new hypotheses and 
searches.  
- Schematise (8): At this point the information may be re-represented in some 
schematic manner. If there are no tools available, this may be retained in the mind 
of the analyst, informally or with an elaborate computer-based method, for 
example, a time line visualisation to coordinate many events. Evidence may be 
organised into small-scale stories about typical topics or in answer to typical 
questions (eg. who? what? when? where? why? how?) that are used to organise 
raw evidence.  
- Build case (11): A theory or case is built by the additional marshalling of evidence 
to support or disconfirm hypotheses.  
- Tell story (14): A presentation or publication of a case is made to the client. 
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- Re-evaluate (15): Inquiries or feedback from clients of a presentation may generate 
re-evaluations of the current theory developed by an analyst requiring the 
marshalling of additional evidence to support or disconfirm the theory, or the 
generation and testing of alternative theories.  
- Search for support (12): Analysis or re-evaluation of theories may require re-
examination of the lower-level schematic organisation of basic facts.  
- Search for evidence (9): Analysis or re-evaluation of theories may require the re-
examination of collected evidence or lead to searches for new evidence.  
- Search for relations (6): Nuggets of information in an evidence file may suggest 
new patterns (eg. people linked to other people) that generate hypotheses about 
plausible relations among entities and events. These hypotheses may generate new 
searches and data extraction from the shoebox and raw data.  
- Search for information (3): New hypotheses generated from processes at higher 
levels may cause the analyst to dig deeper in the raw data.  
Figure 24: Pirolli’s Notional Model of the Intelligence Analysis Process208 
                                                 
208  Pirolli, Peter L. 2007. Assisting People to become Independent Learners in the Analysis of Intelligence. 
Final Technical Report, 2 
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The value of Pirolli’s model lies mainly in the fact that analysts will be able to test their own 
cognitive process and identify so-called leverage points or milestones in the process which 
can be improved upon, either through technical tools or mindfulness.   
5.1.2.3  Analytical rigour matrix 
Analysts are continually plagued by uncertainty whether they have enough information to 
validate their hypotheses. They are also concerned that if they wait for confirmation from 
other sources the intelligence might have become irrelevant. An Analytical Rigour Model that 
might assist analysts in being mindful of and reflective on the whole intelligence process was 
developed by Zelik, Patterson and Woods in 2007 (see Figure 25). This model enriches the 
structured self critique technique of Heuer and Pherson (discussed in Chapter 4). Zelik et al 
do not see rigour as the strict adherence to standardised routines and processes, but as “an 
assessment of degree of sufficiency, rather than the degree of adherence to an established 
analytic procedure”.209 In their study, their Analytical Rigour Model was found to be most 
useful in the production phase of the intelligence process where the actual product is 
measured collaboratively by determining the sufficiency of rigour in the analytical process.  
Figure 25: Analytical Rigour model of Zelik, Patterson and Woods210 
 
This model has eight indicators of rigour: 
                                                 
209  Zelick, Daniel, Patterson, Emily and Woods, David. 2007. Proceedings of the Eighth International 
Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, 1-4 
210  Zelick, Daniel, Patterson, Emily and Woods, David. 2007. Understanding Rigor in Information Analysis.  
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making.  
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- Hypothesis Exploration describes the extent to which multiple hypotheses are 
considered in explaining data. In a low-rigour process there is minimal weighing 
of alternatives. A high-rigour process, in contrast, involves the broadening of the 
hypothesis set beyond an initial framing and incorporating multiple perspectives to 
identify the best, most probable explanations. 
- Information Search relates to the depth and breadth of the search process used in 
collecting data. A low-rigour analysis process does not go beyond routine and 
readily available data sources, whereas a high-rigour process attempts to explore 
all data potentially available in the relevant sample space exhaustively.  
- Information Validation details the level at which information sources are 
corroborated and cross-validated. In a low-rigour process little effort is made to 
use converging evidence to verify source accuracy, while a high-rigour process 
includes a systematic approach for verifying information and, where possible, 
ensures the use of sources closest to the areas of interest.  
- Stance Analysis is the evaluation of data with the goal of identifying the stance or 
perspective of the source and placing it into a broader context of understanding. At 
the low-rigour level analysts may notice a clear bias in a source, while a high-
rigour process involves research into source backgrounds with the intent of gaining 
a more subtle understanding of how their perspectives might influence their 
respective stances toward analysis-relevant issues.  
- Sensitivity Analysis considers the extent to which analysts consider and understand 
the assumptions and limitations of their analyses. In a low-rigour process, 
explanations seem appropriate and valid on a surface level. In a high-rigour 
process analysts employ strategies to consider the strength of explanations if 
individual supporting sources prove to be invalid.  
- Specialist Collaboration describes the degree to which analysts incorporate the 
perspectives of domain experts into their assessments.  In a low-rigour process 
little effort is made to seek out such expertise, while in a high-rigour process 
analysts have talked to, or may be leading experts themselves, in the key content 
areas of the analysis.  
- Information Synthesis indicates how far beyond mere collecting and listing data 
analysts went in their processes. In the low rigour process analysts simply compile 
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the relevant information in a unified form, whereas a high-rigour process requires 
the extraction and integration of information with a thorough consideration of 
diverse interpretations of the relevant data.  
- Explanation Critique is a different form of collaboration that encapsulates how 
many different perspectives were incorporated in examining the primary 
hypotheses. In a low-rigour process, there is little use for other analysts in 
providing input on explanation quality. In a high-rigour process peers and experts 
would have examined the chain of reasoning and explicitly identified which 
inferences are stronger and which weaker.  
The value of Zelik et al’s Analytical Rigour Model is threefold: firstly, cognitive processes 
are made explicit in a manner that enhances mindfulness; secondly, it provides the first such 
metric to test intelligence products which will improve the quality of intelligence; and thirdly, 
it provides a framework against which collaborative learning, i.e. the popular After Action 
Reviews can take place.  
5.2 Applying Sensemaking theories 
It is generally agreed, in the third KM generation, that complexity forces one to apply 
different skills to cope with uncertainty and sometimes totally unexpected events in the 
intelligence context, such as 9/11. Sensemaking, a concept derived from cognitive and 
especially organisational theory211, is used in KM to investigate and describe how the 
individual, group and specifically the organisation deal with uncertainty and adapt to 
complexities. Sensemaking is receiving scholarly attention in the defence domain,212 but 
unfortunately very little of this research has filtered through to national security, law 
enforcement or the competitive intelligence domains. 
Only a few authors have commented on the necessity and benefits of sensemaking in 
intelligence organisations, resulting in limited research on the actual application of the 
concept and its practices. The comment by Jeffrey Cooper, already in 2005, that “the primary 
                                                 
211  Sensemaking has been researched on an individual level by Brenda Dervin since the 1980s while Karl 
Weick is regarded as the scholar who developed sensemaking on the organisational level. Other scholars 
include Mika Aaltonen, Gary Klein, Karl Wiig and Dave Snowden. Sensemaking has been applied to 
various disciplines and research areas, ranging from governance, medical care, publishing, library science, 
the military and more recently technology such as artificial intelligence and strategic management. See 
Weick, Karl E. 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. 
212  The US Department of Defence has done research on sensemaking since their first symposium held in 2001 
in Virginia. Several of their research programmes, such as the project of Pirolli et al, have culminated in 
technological tools that assist decision-making and analytical processes.  
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purpose of analytic effort is ‘sensemaking’ and understanding, not producing reports; the 
objective of analysis is to provide information in a meaningful context, not individual 
factoids”213 might be the strongest indication that the intelligence organisation should move to 
a new Intelligence Analysis paradigm that involves one of sensemaking. 
On an individual level, sensemaking entails the ability to perceive, analyse, represent, 
visualise and make sense of one's environment and situation in a contextually appropriate 
manner.214 This situational and contextual aspect of sensemaking is known in Intelligence 
Analysis as situational awareness or environmental scanning which gives one a sense of what 
the past, present and future dynamics are of variables in an intelligence-relevant situation. 
Leedom215 defines situational awareness as dynamic “situated” knowledge, or the capacity to 
act effectively in a given specific situation, and sensemaking as the process of creating 
situational awareness in situations of uncertainty.  
The relevance of sensemaking in Intelligence Analysis becomes clear when Weick’s216 seven 
properties of sensemaking are applied217 to Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis:  
- Social context: Making sense takes place in a social context. It involves both 
shared meaning and shared experience. When individuals make sense they are 
"influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others." Intelligence 
analysts interact with team members, supervisors, and customers. They strive to 
make sense and communicate meaning within this social network. The benefit of 
group sensemaking methods in Intelligence Analysis is evident in Heuer’s 
statement that “optimal results come from alternating between individual thinking 
and team effort, using group interaction to generate ideas that supplement 
individual thought."218 In 2008, Heuer dedicated an entire paper on small groups in 
the application of structured analysis methods, wherein he offered guidelines on 
how to use social interaction for intelligence.219 It may be wrong to deduct that 
only the structured methods enhance sensemaking as many of the traditional 
                                                 
213  Cooper, Jeffrey R. 2005. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. 42 
214  Cooper, Jeffrey R. 2005. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. 47 
215  Leedom, Dennis K. 2001. Sense making symposium Final Report. 23-25 October 2001, 8 
216  Weick, Karl E. 2001. Making sense of the organization. 461- 463 
217  McBeth, Michael S. 2002. Approaches to Enhance Sensemaking for Intelligence Analysis. McBeth’s 
comparison gives a limited application value and does not relate it to intelligence sufficiently. The author 
expanded the concepts and the linkages with Heuer’s book. 
218  Heuer, Richards J. 1999. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. 78 
219  Heuer, Richards J. 2008. Small Group Processes for Intelligence Analysis 
94 
 
intuitive methods also espouse the social aspect of sensemaking.  Many of the new 
analytical techniques discussed in Chapter 4 use collaborative or social 
sensemaking deliberately, which is the difference. 
- Grounded in identity construction: Weick states that a person’s sense of who he is 
in a setting and anything that threatens or enhances that sense provides a centre 
from which judgements of relevance and sense fan out. Analysts have several roles 
as well as a self-image associated with each role which determines how they 
interpret and make sense of a situation. This relates to Heuer’s notion that 
intelligence analysts must understand themselves before they can understand 
others. Further research on the “different identities” of the intelligence analyst will 
be useful to determine exactly how the identity construction dynamics influence 
the sensemaking process.220 
- Retrospective: How we make sense in the present is determined by our previous 
perceptions, even if the delay is measured in microseconds, as we are always 
retrospectively attempting to establish cause and effect and derive meaning from 
each context. Heuer states that "we tend to perceive what we expect to 
perceive,"221 based on what we have learned in the past. Also, "mind-sets tend to 
be quick to form but resistant to change" and "new information is assimilated to 
existing images" which both explain why analysts who have studied a specific 
intelligence problem for several years miss signals that a novice would pick up. 
Also, cognitive biases based on previous experiences affect the sensemaking of 
analysts significantly. 
- Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy: People make sense on the basis of 
how coherent events are, the extent of sufficiency and certainty for present 
purposes, and credibility. Plausibility is grounded in the interlinking dynamics of 
the other characteristics, namely agreements with others, consistency with one’s 
own stake in events, the recent past, visible cues, ongoing events, familiar 
scenarios and actions that have tangible effects. In Intelligence Analysis this is 
                                                 
220  Sara Taylor conducted some research on the different worlds of the intelligence analyst which she 
identified as: 1) customer, 2) discipline, 3) subject-environment, 4) sources, and 5) the self that opens 
various possibilities of sensemaking research in this field. See Taylor, Susan M. 2005. The Several Worlds 
of the Intelligence Analyst, paper presented at the 2005 International Conference on Intelligence Analysis, 
McClean, VA, May 3, 2005.  
221  Heuer, Richards J. 1999. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. 8 
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evident when possible hypotheses are brainstormed and those with less plausibility 
discarded, especially in a group setup. 
- Ongoing: Making sense takes place through perceptions carved out of a continuous 
stream of consciousness. Sensemaking is constrained not only by past events, but 
also by our inability to bind ongoing events or continuously update our actions or 
interpretations. Intelligence analysts who do not keep abreast of new developments 
on their desks as a continuous flow of interpretation, find it difficult to make sense 
when an event happens unexpectedly. Therefore, it remains crucial that analysts 
develop the skill of updating continuously and focusing on those factors that might 
create an interruption in the flow of events. Scenario development and similar 
techniques will assist in this effort.  
- Extracting from salient cues: How we make sense involves noticing and extracting 
cues from our environment. Context and mental state affect how efficiently people 
pick up and use cues, usually to strengthen an initial hunch or hypothesis 
selectively. On the other hand, familiarity and experience allow people to notice 
when something unusual occurs or when something important is missing. Stress, 
overload or even “expert arrogance” makes it more difficult to notice cues that 
would otherwise easily be picked up. Heuer’s approach to this issue is to apply a 
multidimensional lens to a problem using the different techniques described in 
Chapter 4.  
- Enacting: Our actions help determine how we make sense of our environment, i.e. 
asking questions, stating a viewpoint to see what the reactions are or probing to see 
how something/someone reacts. In the intelligence sphere, analysts would send out 
taskings to the collecting agencies on an issue and see what the sources’ responses 
are; present a briefing and request feedback and questions, or draft reports that 
articulate their viewpoints, thereby eliciting responses that would assist them in 
their sensemaking efforts. 
Fishbein and Treverton cite Klein, Stewart and Claxton who state that empirical research 
showed that intuitive judgement underpins most organisational decisions and that it is 
superior to the analysis of problems marked by high ambiguity or uncertainty, because efforts 
to “reduce” such problems (to identify a handful of key variables) to fit into structured 
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analytic frameworks produce misleading results.222 The sensemaking paradigm might balance 
the current drive for structured analysis as the latter is seen as less effective in the complex 
Knowledge Age. However, the application of sensemaking as seen through the lens of third 
generation KM needs to be explored further in the intelligence context to be really beneficial 
to analysts and decision-makers alike.  
5.3  New organisational structures?  
Peter Drucker states that the Knowledge Age and the productivity of knowledge workers such 
as intelligence analysts, demand fundamental changes in the structure of organisations – even 
“totally new organisations”.223 He proposes a flatter management hierarchy with knowledge 
workers networking and moving in-and-out of positions of authority, while moving from one 
assignment to the next. Numerous scholars similarly advocate a networked, flatter 
organisational structure that enhances collaboration and reduces the chain of command, 
thereby empowering decision-making to the lowest level in the organisation. Linking the 
sensemaking paradigm to the organisational structure, Weick224 states that if the 
organisational design maintains or strengthens the seven properties of sensemaking, people 
will be enabled to continue making sense of what they face. However, if the design 
undermines or weakens any of them, they will lose their grasp on what may be occurring. The 
organisational form/structure must be equipped to affirm the following questions: 
- Social context: Does it encourage conversation? 
- Identity: Does it give the people a distinct, stable sense of who they are and what 
they represent? 
- Retrospect: Does it preserve elapsed data and legitimate the use of that data? 
- Salient cues: Does it enhance the visibility of cues? 
- Ongoing: Does it enable people to be resilient in the face of interruptions? 
- Plausibility: Does it encourage people to accumulate and exchange plausible 
accounts? 
- Enactment: Does it encourage interaction or hesitation? 
                                                 
222  Fishbein, Warren and Treverton, Gregory. 2004. Sherman Kent Centre for Intelligence Analysis Occasional 
Papers, 3(2), 2 
223  Drucker, Peter. 1994. Post-capitalist society. 93 
224  Weick, Karl E. 2001. Making sense of the organization. 463-464 
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In a reality check, Berkowitz and Goodman state categorically that the intelligence 
organisation is “ill-suited” for the Information Age.225 It is a typically large Weberian 
bureaucracy226 with centralised planning, routine operations and a hierarchical chain of 
command. Not only do intelligence organisations operate in strict need-to-know stovepipes, 
but they also isolate themselves from the outside world as they work with “secrets obtained 
through secret means and methods.” The intelligence community may be “locked into 
outdated technologies, collection operations, and analytical methodologies, even when new 
and possibly better ideas come along.”227    
In a damning book about the organisational origins of the US’ intelligence failures, Zegart228 
discusses the intelligence community’s inability to adapt. In her research, she found that only 
10% of the 340 intelligence reform recommendations made by various commissions were 
implemented between 1991 and 2001. A staggering 79% of the recommendations did not 
receive any attention. She identified three “organisational roots of failure”: 
- Structure: Internal fragmentation according to regions and not cases/threats – 
which meant that there was gross duplication of intelligence efforts against the 
same targets but in different locations, while there was no coordination of regional 
structures on headquarter level to synergise intelligence processes. The fact that no 
accountability was seated in one organisation or position meant that there was a 
plethora of heads, all with different mandates and interests that needed to be 
advanced. 
- Culture: A parochial culture that is averse to change where “need to know” trumps 
“need to share”. The organisations have a reactive attitude where there is little 
foresight and only narrow analysis is done. The irony of this should not go 
unnoticed: even though intelligence organisations’ main business is to be proactive 
and provide foreknowledge on issues critical to national decision-making, they 
cannot apply the same principles and processes to the management of the 
organisation.  
                                                 
225  Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allan E. 2000. Best Truth: Intelligence and Security in the Information 
Age, 67  
226  Nomikos, John M. 2004. The Journal of Intelligence History. 4(2), 6 
227  Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allan E. 2000. Best Truth: Intelligence and Security in the Information 
Age, 45 
228  Zegart, Amy B. 2009. Spying blind: The CIA, the FBI and the origins of 9/11, 36 and Chapter 4 and 6. 
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- Incentives: The focus is on urgent and not important intelligence needs (the typical 
putting-out-fires syndrome), a prevailing attitude of “what gets measured gets 
done” that drives numbers of agents or numerous reports and not the quality, while 
analysts are seen as “second class citizens”. In addition, outdated information 
technology is used that makes it cumbersome and difficult to share intelligence. 
Perpetual organisational restructuring,229 also in South Africa, has been more about political 
tampering and grandstanding than streamlining effectiveness and adapting to challenges set 
by the new world. The management structure has resultantly become heavier, with more 
layers of control and review than ever before. One would increasingly find “project teams” in 
an intelligence organisation and across agency boundaries. Although operationally effective, 
this results in a command nightmare for organisational structures that still adhere to 
hierarchical performance management systems. The author’s own experience is that analysts 
involved in such inter-agency project teams are penalised because their direct supervisor often 
does not understand and appreciate their contributions to the project team.  
A report in April 2009 by the US’ Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Inspector General 
criticised the DNI (created in 2005 to coordinate all intelligence efforts in the US) by stating 
that the “bureaucratic bloat, financial mismanagement and a failure to end the turf battles 
among America’s spy agencies (that) led to disastrous intelligence failures in recent years”. It 
could not deliver on “its mandate to streamline Intelligence Analysis or to force collaboration 
between the different agencies”. Ironically, a few days after the report was made public, the 
new DNI replaced the IG with a new person. 230   
The criticism might be unrealistic as few organisations of that magnitude – both in and 
outside government – would have been able to correct the organisational structure, culture and 
related factors that have shaped a country’s intelligence apparatus in such a short time span – 
4 years. Organisational change in intelligence will always be subject to political pandering, 
and as of yet, none of the critics could recommend feasible options other than those initiated 
by the ODNI. There has, for instance, been limited research on feasible organisational 
structures where the premium on timely decision-making, sometimes based on secret and 
deception-prone information, is as high. The fairness of the criticism is further questioned by 
                                                 
229  The intense debate over the restructuring of the US intelligence community continues unabatedly. The 
establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which supersedes all other 
intelligence agencies, as well the Department of Homeland Security has voiced unprecedented criticism.  
230  Mazzetti, Mark. 2009. “Report Faults U.S. Spy Agencies”.  The New York Times. 1 April 2009 and Benson, 
Pam. 2009. “Intelligence Chief replaces Inspector General”. CNN 4 April 2009. 
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the comment that organisations should have been “forced to collaborate” while it is a known 
fact that knowledge cannot be conscripted but only volunteered.231 In fact, the DNI has 
achieved much with its analytical transformation initiative; most importantly, from the 
perspective of this thesis, is the start of the collaborative efforts discussed hereunder.  
5.4 Collaboration and information sharing 
Fishbein and Treverton232 stress the need for collaboration in intelligence by stating that 
making sense of complex transnational issues requires an ongoing organisational, mindfulness 
process where intelligence organisations institutionalise sustained, collaborative efforts by 
analysts to question their judgments and underlying assumptions by employing both critical 
and creative modes of thought. For this approach to be effective, they warn that significant 
changes will be required in the cultures and business processes of analytic organisations.  
In addition to internal collaboration, analysts would also benefit from wider, external  
networking and collaboration to keep tabs on what happens in other industries which will 
enrich their viewpoints on where the system is moving, expand their knowledgeable network 
and foster synergies from other industries that might enrich intelligence, especially in the 
technology field. However, the intelligence organisation’s secretive culture is deeply rooted 
and will be extremely difficult to change. Harris233 confirms this by stating that secretive 
stovepipes erect barriers to lateral collaboration by restricting communications and rewarding 
only bureaucratic loyalty within the organisation. Lahneman234 is a bit more cautious of 
grand-scale organisational changes and proposes that intelligence organisations be enabled to 
generate ad hoc collaborative networks with outside experts for various lengths of time to 
provide intelligence on issues demanding interdisciplinary analysis. 
The fact remains that there should be an institutionalised effort by intelligence organisations 
to develop and nurture formal and informal collaborative ecologies. There are, however, two 
factors that inhibit collaboration, both inside organisations and also with outside experts: 
- The first is the counterintelligence concern. The threats intelligence organisations 
face, both of a state and non-state nature, include efforts to deceive and frustrate, 
whether by human agents or technological means. To discard all caution in an 
                                                 
231  See discussion of Dave Snowden’s heuristics for Knowledge Management in Chapter 2. 
232  Fishbein, Warren and Treverton, Gregory. 2004. Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional 
Papers, 3(2),10 
233  Harris, James W. 2002. Policy Analysis, (439), 6 
234  Lahneman, William J. (ed) 2006. The Future of Intelligence Analysis. Volume I. Final Report, 3 
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effort to collaborate would only lead to more problems. It will, however, be 
necessary to “recalibrate” the trade-off between security and collaboration.235 This 
recalibration will be extremely difficult as those responsible for the security and 
countering of intelligence efforts are outside the analytical sphere and have no or 
limited understanding of or empathy with the need to network and collaborate to 
improve sensemaking and decision-making.  
- The other impeding factor is the cultural and psychological characteristics of the 
intelligence organisation, which would be very difficult to alter. Some of these 
include groupthink, competition to get the best intelligence and be rewarded for 
that, aversion to working in teams (both within and interdepartmental), lack of 
trust, sharing of information only on a peer-to-peer basis, fear of sharing bad news, 
office politics236 and the dictum that “if it’s not secret it has no value”.  
Despite these drawbacks, there have been significant developments during the past five years 
in the US and other countries, where the “responsibility to share” has started to replace the 
outdated “need-to-know” intelligence principle. The use of social media has played a major 
role in crossing divides between different organisations and creating collaborative spaces and 
flows. 
5.4.1 Collaboration across organisations and disciplines 
A promising development in the intelligence domain is the increased cooperation between and 
among different intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies – 
such as fire, health, and transportation – and the private sector in the US’ Fusion Centres. The 
aim of the Fusion Centres is to provide a mechanism through which government, law 
enforcement, public safety and the private sector can come together with a common purpose 
of improving the ability to “safeguard our homeland and prevent criminal activity.”237  
In a major policy shift in July 2008, the ODNI issued Directive 205 to all intelligence 
agencies stipulating that analysts should leverage expert knowledge both in and outside the 
US. All intelligence agencies had to appoint an Outreach Director who is responsible for this 
liaison to network with external experts and facilitate such networking within the 
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237  United States Department of Justice. 2006. Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New 
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organisational and security constraints.238 Cross-organisational and multidisciplinary 
networking has already borne fruit in Singapore where that country’s early warning system 
brought together multiple approaches and perspectives from a variety of partnership 
organisations. A multitude of horizon-scanning concepts and methods were implemented and 
a suite of technological tools used to operationalise it.239  
The US has promoted the use of social tools for collaboration between analysts of different 
agencies as one of the ODNI’s priorities. In their recent research among analysts of the 
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Dixon and McNamara240 found that Intellipedia 
(discussed in Chapter 4) has the potential of changing the nature of intelligence analysts’ 
work. Although Intellipedia functions mainly as information sharing rather than a joint 
production/collaboration platform, it creates the opportunity for analysts to identify experts in 
their fields or related ones for social networking and targeted communication. Intellipedia has 
also become a “Knowledge Marketplace” where users go to “buy” or find information they 
need, as well as “sell” the products they have produced to others. The significance of this is 
that knowledge, traditionally locked up in organisational silos, is now made accessible in one 
single site to all in the intelligence community who have the appropriate security and 
functional clearance. New work behaviours identified by Dixon and McNamara include that 
analysts incorporate more sources in their reporting than previously by using reports written 
by other agencies, display an eagerness to portray an increased professional presence, and 
present intelligence to a wider audience for consumption, regardless of whether it is rewarded 
or not.  
Analyst Space or A-Space, with high-end security features, is a customised collaboration tool 
launched in September 2008 with about 10 000 US analysts in June 2009 and is another 
initiative of the ODNI. 241 It gives analysts access to shared and personal workspaces such as 
wikis, blogs, widgets, RSS feeds and other tools based on the popular My Space and 
Facebook. Its primary benefit is that A-Space brings to analytic work a platform for 
                                                 
238  Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2008. Intelligence Community Directive 205: Analytical 
Outreach.  
239   Nathan, Patrick. 2006. Strategic Foresight and Warning Seminar Series, 8. Also see the Risk Assessment 
and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) website at http://www.rahs.org.sg. 
240  Dixon, Nancy M. and McNamara Laura A. 2008. Our Experience with Intellipedia: An Ethnographic Study 
at the Defense Intelligence Agency.  
241  Dixon, Nancy M. 2009. How A-Space is Shaping Analysts’ Work. Dixon’s study on how DIA analysts use 
A-Space gives an interesting KM perspective on the emerging networking and sensemaking culture of US 
intelligence analysts.  
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incorporating cognitive diversity seamlessly to address complex analytic issues. The peer-to-
peer environment of A-Space provides a conversational format within which to engage in 
joint sensemaking through the building of networks across agency boundaries as well as the 
improvement of situational awareness. Although A-space has the functionality of co-
authoring, it is not yet used in the normal production process, most probably due to the 
prevailing organisational culture and processes. In view of the necessity for cognitive 
diversity for intelligence analysts to grasp the complexity of an intelligence threat, A-Space 
provides the vehicle for cross-pollination of ideas and viewpoints without the associated time 
and money costs of building and maintaining traditional networks. As it is a new collaboration 
tool, it will be interesting to monitor the usage and uptake in the US intelligence community 
and the extent of impact it has on the ingrained organisational dynamics and relationships.   
5.4.2 Collaboration with the private sector 
The addition of the private sector to the intelligence equation is extremely important. It stands 
to reason that intelligence, or for that matter government, does not have the knowledge to 
assess and analyse energy, infrastructure, public health and environmental issues. The private 
sector and non-governmental organisations are often literally on the frontline, both in terms of 
bearing the first impact and having the knowledge and resources for good prediction and 
response.242 Unfortunately, the perception persists that assistance to intelligence organisations 
might damage their impartiality and marketing value for private clients or other governments. 
Governments are furthermore not keen to approach these institutions for fear of possible 
counterintelligence attacks – the result of an outdated security approach to intelligence that 
overshadows other possible benefits that can be derived from such liaisons and cooperation. 
In addition to valuable intelligence sharing, intelligence organisations can learn quite a few 
KM lessons from these institutions in terms of collaboration, products, source management 
and analytical tools and techniques they employ in their analyses of threats. The Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies formed an online collaborative interest group to discuss 
terrorism and radicalisation. Worthwhile knowledge was obtained in terms of building trust, 
crafting incentives to build and maintain membership, moderating the network to achieve its 
goal as well as measuring effectiveness.243 
5.4.3 Collaboration across national borders 
                                                 
242   Bailes, Alyson JK. 2006. Strategic Foresight and Warning Seminar Series, 7 
243  Anderson, Thomas, Gordon, David, Ben-Ari, Guy. 2008. Understanding International Collaborative 
Online Networks: Lessons identified from the Public, Private and non-Profit sectors 
103 
 
In what may be a radical change towards a more inclusive paradigm, the CIA’s Global 
Futures Partnership invited 120 experts from over 20 foreign governments, intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies and non-governmental think-tanks in November 2005 to participate 
in a conference, aimed at creating a global intelligence network. The Global Futures Forum 
(GFF) was subsequently established as an unclassified, multilateral and multi-sector, by-
invitation-only community that works to identify and make sense of emerging transnational 
issues. Its primary goal is to foster the collaborative development of insight and foresight 
through the exchange of different perspectives. The GFF hopes to achieve the following:244  
- Creating a culture of collaboration by bringing diverse perspectives together to 
work on a problem, harnessing the so-called wisdom of crowds to identify some 
nuances which are missing. 
- Developing more common vocabularies for problems with fewer inter-cultural and 
international misunderstandings.  
- Modernising work practices in a changed world, and 
- Accelerating information sharing to eliminate outdated controls and streamline 
authorities to provide useful information to those that need it.  
In 2008 the GFF detached from the CIA and has since grown substantially to include more 
than 1400 experts, thought leaders and practitioners from more than 40 countries. These 
experts collaborate in communities of interest such as radicalisation, the practice and 
organisation of intelligence, global disease, social networks, illicit trafficking, foresight and 
warning, genocide prevention, terrorism and counterterrorism studies, as well as proliferation. 
The GFF website is the repository of GFF production, which includes hundreds of readings 
and resources on relevant topics, member blogs, discussion forums, and wikis. 
Unfortunately, little evidence of similar collaboration efforts can be found in the literature 
dealing with South Africa. The various regional and continental joint committees on security 
and intelligence are ad hoc political structures with no or little interaction, let alone 
collaboration between the functionaries of the different countries. Interaction mostly only 
takes place between senior politicians and the management of intelligence organisations that 
receive briefings from analysts beforehand. As such collaboration, to the extent and depth 
described above, is non-existent in the African context. Liaison between NGOs and other 
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private organisations might be more prevalent, but has limited, if any application in the 
intelligence realm. 
5.5 Outsourcing  
Another new trend in organisations, even intelligence organisations world-wide, is 
outsourcing.  In 1994 Drucker stated that only service work, i.e. manual and clerical work will 
be outsourced by government, and that the company or government department will focus 
only on its mission.245 However, in what has become a new “form of collaboration”246, 
companies worldwide are outsourcing aspects of their core business as well, either because it 
is more cost-effective, or they do not have the necessary skills to perform the work 
themselves. The same trend in intelligence organisations is discernible – in the US at least. 
Intelligence Analysis is increasingly outsourced to private companies because the intelligence 
organisation does not itself have the capacity to do analysis. The analyst community of the US 
has shrunk by 23 percent since the 1990s,247 while the scope and challenges for Intelligence 
Analysis has both expanded and intensified. 
Recruiting new analysts is a cumbersome process – the recruitment and security clearance 
processes could take up to a year before an appointment is made, and up to three years before 
the analysts are knowledgeable enough to function independently. In the fast-changing, high-
threat environment, the intelligence customer does not have time to wait until someone is 
ready to do an in-depth analysis. Many seasoned analysts have left the intelligence 
community since the 1990s, some of them due to the severe budget constraints at that time, 
but others more recently because of retirement or ethical and professional differences with the 
new leadership.248  
Most of these analysts are now working for companies that receive contracts to do 
Intelligence Analysis in the US.249 A former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence and now 
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head of the BAE Systems’ Global Analysis Group, John Gannon’s view is that any “kind of 
structure you set up to deal with the analytic challenges today has to recognize you are in a 
revolutionary new environment where information and expertise are distributed in ways that 
were not the case a generation ago.” 250  
The downside of Intelligence Analysis outsourcing is that the government’s own analytical 
corps is not nurtured and developed, while the reliance on government budgets, controlled by 
political parties put these companies in jeopardy, e.g. in the US, it is expected that Congress 
might overturn the previous administration’s intelligence policies and reduce the number of 
contractors employed by the intelligence agencies.   
A similar trend of outsourcing is not discernible in South Africa. Intelligence organisations 
might request research papers from academics and institutions in specific areas and on 
intelligence-related issues where there is a need, but these are limited. The hiring out of 
analysts to especially smaller companies that do not have the capacity themselves, has not yet 
taken root in South Africa, most probably because of the unawareness of the benefit analysts 
might bring to the decision-making of the organisation, but also because proprietary and 
security issues might pose a perceived problem with information security.   
5.6 Analytical technological tools  
As seen in Chapter 2, technological tools are only the enablers for better knowledge sharing 
or analysis and can never supplant the analyst’s mind, situational awareness and sensemaking 
abilities. Too frequently technological tools, like link-network analysis suites, have been sold 
to intelligence organisations at large premiums, just to remain mere icons on one or two 
analysts’ desktops. When there is no understanding of when to use which tool, for what 
purposes, and the sensemaking capabilities to interpret the picture are also lacking, 
technological tools are of little benefit to any organisation.  
Technology has provided intelligence organisations with a large volume of data and 
information, but it has not provided any significant improvement regarding knowledge, 
interpretation and assessment. Technology alone can still not predict intentions, detect targets’ 
capabilities, prioritise risks or forewarn. Unfortunately, intelligence organisations continue to 
spend disproportionate resources on the newest versions of information aggregation and 
                                                 
250  Abbott, Sebastian.2006. The Outsourcing of U.S. Intelligence Analysis: Will it make us more or less safe?  
July 28, 2006 (electronic version) 
106 
 
mining tools, while few, if any resources are used to improve the analysts’ thinking skills and 
understanding of the new complex threat environment.  
Technological tools that will continue to be useful, if applied in the correct context will be 
visualisation tools like those discussed in Chapter 4, and ones aiming at enhancing 
sensemaking and collaboration. In the last instance, intelligence stands to gain significantly 
from success and failure stories in the KM environment where it has become apparent that 
people will not just use tools because they are available, but need to see the benefits, and then 
also have the time and support to apply them. Organisational, information and computer-
literacy factors also impact on the uptake of new technological tools, making the prognosis for 
their large-scale implementation throughout the intelligence community doubtful. In the 
African context where very few intelligence organisations have even the most basic 
information systems, coupled with poor Internet bandwidth access, technological tools similar 
to those found in the developed world’s intelligence organisations, remain a fantasy.  
In conclusion, it can be argued that the new Intelligence Analysis paradigm poses serious 
challenges to the way analysts and their organisations understand and apply their cognitive 
abilities. Incremental actions are necessary to make this a reality.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Accepting the challenges 
 
“It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of 
success nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things; for the reformer 
has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those 
who would profit by the new order; this lukewarmness arising partly from the incredulity of 
mankind who does not truly believe in anything new until they actually have experience of it.” 
Nicolo Machiavelli 
The Prince 
 
This thesis aimed at discussing challenges the intelligence community, and especially those 
analysts responsible for creating specific knowledge for decision-makers face in the 
Knowledge Age. While acknowledging that not all facets of these challenges could be dealt 
with conclusively within the scope of the thesis, it provides a more than peripheral glimpse of 
the frustrations as well as the ideals of intelligence officers who are trying to make sense of an 
ever-changing intelligence landscape.  
Accepting the challenges will require brave and bold commitment combined with personal, 
group and organisational endeavours which have the potential to alter the nature of 
intelligence organisations as they have functioned since the 1940s. Introducing large-scale 
changes half-heartedly by merely re-dressing old paradigms, or introducing changes in a 
piece-meal, drawn-out manner, will only result in increased frustration and organisational 
entropy. Therefore, a multi-pronged approach is required to manage the change effectively, to 
assist intelligence organisations and their analysts to co-evolve apace with the current 
demands, especially those of the Knowledge Age. 
6.1 Understanding post-modern intelligence  
The first requirement of intelligence officers, their leaders and the decision-makers would be 
to understand how the world, the intelligence issues and social interactions have altered the 
general understanding and conduct of intelligence. Training in and debating the concepts, 
applications and implications of complexity, the complex adaptive systems, and the post-
modern world are necessary to grasp the extent of the political, economic and social change 
globally. One of the concepts that need to be recalibrated is the actual role of intelligence 
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organisations in the complex, uncertain, and often messy, new world order. Intelligence will 
quite understandably not be able to reduce uncertainty by attempting to anticipate all the 
threats, due to the unpredictability of the complex system. Technologies, cognition techniques 
and even collaboration might improve the intelligence system to a certain extent, but will not 
reduce the inevitability of random acts of connected, heterogeneous actors operating on 
different system levels simultaneously. There is also no guarantee that clients will be willing 
or able to use intelligence for their decision-making. Intelligence organisations should realise 
that they are not only spectators analysing the actions and intentions of actors in the complex 
adaptive system, but that they can also react to, sense, prod and, to a certain extent, manage 
the interactions and dynamics in that system. This perspective could offer new options in 
policy drafting and decision-making, which have been unexplored by intelligence 
organisations.  
One outcome of such rigorous debate might be the realisation that in the Knowledge Age, 
traditional intelligence organisations have been disenfranchised from holding the monopoly 
over their core intelligence functions - forewarning. In fact, the intelligence “space” has 
expanded with stakeholders and role-players like governments, NGOs, transnational 
organisations and companies, private knowledge broker firms, as well as interest and pressure 
groups representing communities, concepts and ideologies. As with most other information 
and knowledge products and services, just-in-time forewarning has become crucial in any 
decision-making context. In turn, decision-making has become dispersed and granular, mostly 
only requiring a generic ability to make sense of information and generate knowledge and 
foreknowledge on possible events, phenomena or behaviour.   
This “democratisation” of intelligence will have an impact on the way intelligence is 
conducted, prompting state intelligence organisations to become open to scrutiny and public 
debates on the value it brings to the safety and security communities. This will most probably 
not be the case in undemocratic countries, although non-governmental role players will 
continue and even increase their intelligence/forewarning activities to protect and further their 
interests parallel to those of the state organs.  
This debate on post-modern intelligence will first and foremost force intelligence 
organisations to explain and justify their raison d’être, re-focusing more on the supposed 
unique value it brings to the decision-maker’s table – whether it be specialised knowledge or 
technological tools, human intelligence access or any other value. Secondly, the debate will 
enhance current understanding of both known and new threats by applying various viewpoints 
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and methods from other disciplines like complexity and the complex adaptive systems theory. 
The intelligence professional has to understand the multi-dimensionality and interrelatedness 
of threats and opportunities. This will optimise decision-making options by probing, 
managing and influencing emerging trends. Thirdly, this debate will force intelligence 
organisations to fundamentally change the way they collect, analyse and distribute 
intelligence: they will need to make use of collaborative and distributed networks to achieve 
that unique value intelligence can bring to the decision-maker in a just-in-time manner.  
One such fundamental change might be the “secrecy” mindset of intelligence organisations. 
They need to understand that collaboration across disciplines, organisations and national 
borders is necessary and does not present an outright security risk. Also, considering what 
secrecy means in the Knowledge Age, intelligence professionals will realise that the 
vagueness of “national security” is open for abuse and has created a corporate culture that 
does not fit in the new mindset of a responsibility to share. Ideally, one might find more 
analysts as well as their managers being at the forefront of such efforts to redefine not only 
what the new threat paradigm means for intelligence overall, but also how the latter responds 
and adapts to these new challenges.  
There should also be more emphasis on actively applying emergent management practices in 
intelligence organisations with fragmented ownership over cognitive and collaborative 
processes, giving small groups more autonomy over intelligence production and 
dissemination. Intelligence organisations should also embrace technologies belonging to the 
Knowledge Age not only to enhance intelligence collection and collaboration, but also to 
create real-time intelligence by bringing the client and analyst closer to each other.  
6.2 Promoting the value of the intelligence analyst as a knowledge 
worker 
In many organisations and countries the value intelligence analysts bring to the intelligence 
process, is not yet realised. Law enforcement and intelligence organisations in both 
developing and developed countries rarely have proper information systems in place; they 
only employ investigators and do not realise the value that a dedicated intelligence analyst 
could bring to such an organisation on an operational and strategic level. Quiggin251 paints an 
equally discouraging picture by stating that less than 1% of countries’ intelligence budgets are 
spent on analysis while 99% is spent on technology, secrecy, infrastructure and other items. 
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The 1% analysis would entail that intelligence analysts spend most of their time receiving, 
reading, manipulating and handling the data, and not thinking, writing and liaising with their 
clients. Bringing this closer to home, a recent study found that African governments give least 
attention to skilled Intelligence Analysis which, together with open sources, is regarded, as 
being a key factor for good intelligence.252   
Reading these figures in context with the impact of post-modern intelligence on the conduct 
and activities of intelligence organisations, it is evident that intelligence analysts might find it 
harder to convince decision-makers that they offer a good value proposition to decision 
support that cannot be met by other specialists or a good information-management system. It 
will remain a challenge to explain the benefits of Intelligence Analysis to uninterested and 
uninformed managers as well as political leaders who think they can make sense of the 
information tsunami on their own. 
To stay relevant, a synergetic partnership between and among intelligence organisations, 
intelligence analysts and academia should be established. Analysts need to be encouraged to 
enhance their knowledge-worker capabilities and expert knowledge on those issues relevant to 
clients while they should also be allowed to have closer contact with the relevant decision-
maker(s). Educational opportunities should also be created to promote the establishment of 
Intelligence Analysis as a profession on a par with others like engineering and medicine. The 
trend in the US to offer intelligence-related undergraduate and postgraduate programmes has 
sparked professionalism in intelligence, but much still needs to be done, specifically in South 
Africa and other developing countries, where there is little emphasis on and resources 
available for life-long learning opportunities for intelligence professionals, let alone 
intelligence academic programmes. Professionalism will create a better cadre of intelligence 
analysts which might minimise the impact of political manipulation on the overall intelligence 
process.  
Seeing intelligence analysts as knowledge workers has far-reaching implications for human 
resources, recruitment and security policies and practices of intelligence organisations. 
Knowledge workers thrive on networking, exploring new frontiers and are not comfortable 
with restricting structures and norms. Many of the new generation have lived in or visited 
countries or were involved in activities that might pose security problems, but which might 
also add to an intelligence organisation’s understanding of a foreign culture or intelligence 
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problem. Furthermore, knowledge workers are known to be more loyal to their profession 
than to the organisation they work for, which bodes well for the analysis profession, but not 
for intelligence organisations which already struggle to retain analysts.  
The mushrooming private research institutions and intelligence organisations are ostensibly 
more open to the networking and collaboration needs of knowledge workers. If intelligence 
organisations are not willing to adapt to the challenges posed by the Knowledge Age, they 
could resultantly lose more qualified and younger generation intelligence analysts to private 
intelligence domains. Worse still, they could also lose their credibility in the long run because 
their analysts might not be part of the collective intelligence effort. This could in turn lead to 
more outsourcing, making intelligence organisations nothing more than specialised collecting 
agencies without the capacity to evaluate, integrate and contextualise raw intelligence. 
Labelling intelligence analysts as knowledge workers might assist in understanding their 
cognitive processes, but it also challenges analysts to fulfil the role of such knowledge 
workers: managing knowledge to create ideas and solve problems, having foresight to sense 
future knowledge needs, being lifelong multidisciplinary learners, being convergent thinkers 
who can use different approaches to understand complex issues yet collaborating across 
disciplines. Even if the current restricting organisational culture or hierarchical structure were 
to change, it is axiomatic that not all intelligence analysts possess these qualities. Not only 
does this compel recruitment divisions to recruit the right type of person, but more 
importantly, it forces analysts to be honest in their self-critique and understand the 
responsibilities and challenges required for a knowledge worker.   
6.3 Learning from Knowledge Management theories and practices  
Improving Intelligence Analysis will not be an easy endeavour, but incorporating or applying 
theories from other disciplines might mean that the wheel does not need to be re-invented or 
that the same mistakes made. Some of the referred to disciplines include psychology, 
decision-making and organisational theory which will undoubtedly broaden our understanding 
of the complexities analysts, their organisations as well as their clients face. It can also 
highlight the trans-disciplinary nature of Intelligence Analysis, and strengthen efforts to 
professionalise and establish it as a separate discipline in the social sciences.  
One domain from which Intelligence Analysis can benefit is that of Knowledge Management, 
which, like the former, is also involved in a rigorous debate on concepts, theories and 
approaches to knowledge and their uses. If KM theorists like Firestone and McElroy urge 
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intelligence organisations to consider the benefits KM might have for intelligence253, it might 
be organisations to consider the benefits KM might have for intelligence; it might be 
worthwhile to look at Intelligence Analysis through the lens of KM. Not only could it assist in 
understanding and appreciating the intelligence analyst as a knowledge worker, but it can also 
enhance the knowledge-creation process as well as the knowledge-sharing and collaboration 
aspects of the intelligence process. The organisational theories based on KM concepts and 
practices could assist intelligence organisations to achieve their goals and objectives more 
effectively.  
Several lessons can be learnt by the nexus between Intelligence Analysis and Knowledge 
Management. The first is that the third KM generation’s contention that knowledge is both a 
“thing” and a “flow” creates a framework from which visionary intelligence scholars and 
practitioners can propose changes in mindset and applications. However, to a large extent, 
intelligence organisations still regard knowledge only as codified artefacts like intelligence 
products and information systems and suffer the same hardships as companies caught in the 
first and second KM generations.  
Secondly, complexity theory frames the understanding of our new reality, explaining to a 
certain degree why we find it so difficult to understand threats and intelligence problems and 
are able to predict intelligence surprises. It also provides a framework for understanding 
intelligence analysts’ continuous movement between relatively simple tasks and those of 
immense complexity for which we have few answers or methodologies.  Our vocabulary is 
also transformed to emphasise that we can only estimate, as it is impossible to have all the 
facts or interpretations due to differences in contextualisation.  
Thirdly, the cognitive and collaborative knowledge-creation processes of individuals and 
group analysts should be researched so that we are clear on what we do, how we do it as well 
as how we can improve our sensemaking abilities.  
Also, if it’s true that “we never know what we know until we need to know it” and that “we 
will always tell more than we can write down”, then new methods of augmenting the 
intelligence product (the knowledge thing) with a “shared understanding” (the knowledge 
flow during conversations) are necessary. The format and manner in which intelligence is 
disseminated needs to be reconsidered. A collaborative, meaningful conversation on an 
intelligence problem with the client, either through face-to-face contact or via technology is 
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bound to provide more trust and dividends than the current impersonal, minimalistic 
intelligence product. This might, however, prove to be too idealistic; leaving intelligence 
analysts with no other choice but to feed fragmented strategic insights to the client who 
already has a limited attention span, thereby assisting or supporting the decision-maker in 
his/her own sensemaking processes. It might be prudent to provide the client with the choice 
of either receiving fragmented, unstructured intelligence as-it-happens and/or reading a 
longer, integrative document. 
The fifth lesson to be learnt from Knowledge Management theory and practices is that the 
Cynefin framework provides a dynamic roadmap for analysts to identify and deal with 
intelligence problems on the whole continuum of complexity. For knowable issues they not 
only have to learn new analytical techniques, but also need to be aware of the shifting 
dynamics which might require moving to more collaborative sensemaking to deal with 
complexity and chaos.  
Lastly, the collaborative nature of many of the newly structured analytical methods in the 
knowable domain actually creates a cognitive bridge to sensemaking in the complex domain, 
which should make it easier for analysts to be move readily between the different domains. 
However, at this stage analysts and their organisations are ill-prepared for the cognitive and 
collaborative challenges required by many of the structured analytical techniques proposed by 
Heuer and Pherson. Furthermore, if they are unable to learn and apply new analytical 
techniques in the knowable domain, will they be able to deal with a new concept like 
sensemaking which belongs in the complex domain?   
6.4  Adopting a mindset of resilience, mindfulness and double-
loop learning 
Other concepts found in KM and its related disciplines that might prove to be useful for 
application in Intelligence Analysis include resilience and agility of organisations and 
individuals to survive in situations of high complexity and uncertainty. To deal with the 
unexpected, people tend to improve their capacity for resilience by refining self-knowledge, 
relational knowledge, content knowledge and their abilities to act “thinkingly.”254  
None of the other proposals would have an impact on intelligence organisations unless they 
build their capacity for resilience in the event of strategic surprises and incorrect analyses. 
                                                 
254  See Weick, Karl E and Sutcliffe, Kathleen M. 2001. Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High 
Performance in an Age of Complexity, 178 
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This can be brought about by firstly interrogating cognitive abilities and processes and 
looking at improved methods and techniques to externalise or formalise thinking processes. 
Also, the process of being able to dissect intelligence “failures” in such a contextualised 
manner that individuals and organisations truly learn from their mistakes helps build the 
capacity to understand systems and cope with errors, even though the same ones might not be 
repeated. Thirdly, in the fast moving complex world, resilience forces one to act while 
thinking, making the learning process much quicker, even though errors (and corrections) 
might be done during the process. Another aspect guiding resilience in organisations is the 
fact that everyone knows and understands the system, which means that more people are 
aware of the possible weaknesses and therefore ready to manage problems stemming from 
them. The secrecy, frequent blame games and political manoeuvring in intelligence is a far 
cry from this requirement. Also, the current management style in intelligence organisations 
lacks the kind of leadership found in resilient organisations, which is based on expertise and 
not on rank or position. Those with the best knowledge of a problem deal with it, thereby 
shifting decision-making to the most appropriate person.      
Mindfulness would best be achieved if analysts, as stated previously, are made aware of their 
thinking processes and introduced to other methods and techniques to enhance their cognitive 
abilities. Those analysts or knowledge workers with the widest range of cognitive skills are 
able to choose the “right” methods and approaches intuitively from their improved and 
expanded arsenal if they are aware or mindful of what, how and why they do it. It is alarming 
that most intelligence analysts are still fixated on the traditional intelligence cycle, unaware of 
the available alternative models and techniques and exercise very little intellectual rigour in 
their estimates. A deliberate change process must occur in intelligence organisations through 
training, coaching and review processes to introduce and embed mindful, analytical processes, 
techniques and methods.  
Double-loop learning is closely related to mindfulness where analysts not only correct their 
ineffective thinking and other working behaviours, but also identify and address the internal 
and external causes of that ineffective behaviour. This requires self-observation and reflection 
on the one hand, but also a critical look at what the root causes of ineffective behaviour or 
thinking might be, as well as looking for possible solutions. It also necessitates a commitment 
to learning and self-improvement. Of course, individuals as well as organisations practising 
double-loop learning become more conscious of both internal and external stressors and risks 
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(they practise situational awareness), making them much more effective in proactively 
engaging systemic leverages to their advantage. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The transformation of Intelligence Analysis in the US by instituting alternative analysis 
methods and specifically facilitating and enabling cross-organisational collaboration through 
Web 2.0 social tools in a matter of only three years, makes one excited that real change is 
possible. However, this paradigm shift has not yet filtered through to other countries, among 
them South Africa. 
It would be difficult to introduce the new paradigm on a large-scale in the intelligence 
community. Calls that intelligence organisations should flatten their organisational structures, 
change reward systems to recognise the group rather than the individual contribution, and the 
training of all intelligence professionals to understand and embrace new concepts and 
technologies, are met with ongoing resistance. More importantly, funds to acquire 
technological collaboration and other sensemaking tools are limited, or absent in the case of 
organisations in South Africa and other developing or third world countries.  
Half-hearted, uncoordinated change efforts without the buy-in and continued support of 
political and professional leaders will only lead to further frustration and entropy in the 
intelligence community. It is therefore crucial, as with various other successful KM 
implementations, that a multi-pronged approach be followed with several small-scale and fail-
safe projects focusing on solving intractable problems that conventional methods have failed 
to resolve.  
Hopefully, there will be enough enthused intelligence professionals and leaders in South 
Africa and elsewhere to take on these challenges and overcome personal and organisational 
inertia so that Intelligence Analysis will thrive in the Knowledge Age. 
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